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COMMENT
REFORMATION OF THE FOOD STAMP ACT:
ABATING DOMESTIC HUNGER MEANS
RESISTING "LEGISLATIVE JUNK FOOD"
The Food Stamp Act of 1964' expanded and made permanent the Food
Stamp Program, which was initiated as a pilot project by executive order
under the Kennedy administration. The purpose of the Food Stamp Pro-
gram was to increase the food purchasing power of low-income households
that are financially unable to provide their members with a nutritionally ade-
quate diet. Not surprisingly, the Act's passage in August of 1964 pitched
mostly liberal northern Democrats against conservative Republicans who
opposed transferring the non-administrative costs of state-operated food
stamp programs to the federal government.2 Issues raised by the Food
Stamp Act, such as eligibility requirements, cost apportionment restrictions
on benefit usage, and sanctioning methods to discourage negligence and
fraud, continue to be disputed.' Unfortunately, disagreements over the sub-
stance and administration of the Food Stamp Program are frustrating its
purpose;4 while the political battles continue, an increasing number of
United States citizens are going hungry.5
1. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 stat. 103 (1964) (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030 (1988)).
2. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION, & FORESTRY, 99TH CONG., IST
SESS., THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM: HISTORY, DESCRIPTION, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 17-21
(Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter HISTORY].
3. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text (describing some of the grievances
against Food Stamp Program policies and practices).
4. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988) (regarding the purpose of the Food Stamp
Program).
5. See Michael Lipsky & Marc A. Thibodeau, Domestic Food Policy in the United States,
15 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 319, 320 (1990) (describing the resurgence of hunger as a
consequence of defects in the operation of federal food assistance programs, the economic
recession and budgetary cut-backs in human service programs); LORETTA SCHWARTZ-NOBEL,
STARVING IN THE SHADOW OF PLENTY 26, 90 (1981). Schwartz-Nobel provides evidence of
increasing hunger in the United States but acknowledges that most Americans are unaware of
the problem of domestic hunger. Id. at 27.
The United States does not currently have a comprehensive nutrition surveillance system
with which to quantify hunger or measure its effects on the health of low-income persons.
PHYSICIAN TASK FORCE ON HUNGER IN AMERICA, HUNGER IN AMERICA: THE GROWING
EPIDEMIC 97 (1985) [hereinafter GROWING EPIDEMIC]. What constitutes an adequate diet
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The health and economic repercussions caused by the dramatic increase in
the number of Americans suffering from hunger and under-nutrition are
compelling legislators to take action to abate domestic hunger, especially
among children.6 A large bi-partisan contingent is launching a legislative
drive to remedy the current Food Stamp Act's7 deficiencies, arguing that the
Federal Food Stamp Program authorized by the Act does not adequately
address the nutritional needs of low-income households.'
This Comment analyzes the adequacy of the Food Stamp Program as a
means of abating domestic hunger and increasing self-sufficiency. This
Comment begins by examining the history and current status of domestic
hunger in the United States. This Comment then analyzes the content and
administration of the federal government's most comprehensive legislative
response to domestic hunger, the Food Stamp Act of 1977. Next, this Com-
ment focuses on the virtues and defects of a current legislative effort to revise
the Food Stamp Program, the Mickey Leland Childhood Hunger Relief
Act.9 Finally, this Comment proposes administrative and ideological
changes that would promote equitable and efficient food assistance programs
and thereby decrease domestic hunger.
varies greatly depending on the age and medical history of the individual. See id. at 102-03.
Medical science has established, however, that when an individual is deprived of sufficient
nutrients that person may experience lethargy and weakness and may be more susceptible to
disease. Id. at 98. Government surveys reveal that the nutritional quality of a household's diet
is proportional to its income. Low-income Americans are more likely to consume an inade-
quate amount of calories and suffer from deficiencies in iron, vitamin A and vitamin C. Id. at
104-05. United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) studies show, however, that low-
income persons usually select more nutritious foods than individuals with higher incomes. Id.
at 105. These studies therefore disprove the theory that poor people suffer from nutritional
deficiencies merely because they are ignorant about health and diet and lack of self-discipline.
6. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
7. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-30 (1988).
8. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text. Comprehensive reform of all welfare
programs has become a priority in the wake of increased enrollment and state budget deficits.
See Paul Taylor, Welfare Reformers Seek to Modify Budgets and Behavior, WASH. POST, Dec.
16, 1991, at Al, A9 (reporting that "the fiscal crisis in the states has provoked the most funda-
mental rethinking of welfare in decades"). Implemented and proposed reforms include de-
creasing benefit levels and behavior modification plans. See id.
While this Comment focuses on reformation of the Food Stamp Program, other actions
must also be taken to decrease domestic hunger. See SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, supra note 5, at 156-
58. Solving domestic hunger involves not only welfare reform but also environmental protec-
tion (specifically farmland), decreased dependency on foreign energy suppliers, id. at 156-59,
181-92, and improving the public education system, see Welfare Reform Proposals: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and Nutrition of the House
Comm. on Agric., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1987) [hereinafter Welfare Reform Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Panetta).
9. H.R. 1202, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 757, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS:
AMERICA'S HUNGRY-THEN AND Now
A. Solving a Paradox: Hunger and Malnutrition Amidst an
Overabundance of Agricultural Commodities
Prior to adoption of the first food stamp plan in May of 1939,1° the fed-
eral government provided food assistance by distributing surplus food."
The Agriculture and Food Act of 1935"2 authorized the United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) to freely hand out food to schools,
churches, charitable organizations, and households. 13 USDA's commodity
distribution programs, however, were not solely inspired by the desire to
alleviate domestic hunger.'" Initially, the federal government's primary con-
cern was to eliminate food surpluses that depressed the farm economy.
15
Criticism that food distribution programs did not provide low-income fami-
lies with sufficient variety and quantity of food eventually induced the fed-
eral government to begin using redeemable stamps to increase the poor's
food purchasing power.' 6
The Agriculture and Food Act of 1935 allowed USDA to adopt an experi-
mental plan involving food stamps. A central goal of the food stamp plan,
initially implemented in Rochester, New York, in 1939, was to increase do-
mestic consumption of agricultural products without causing food expendi-
tures to decrease, a risk inherent with distribution programs.' 7 When the
10. See HISTORY, supra note 2, at 4. The program enacted in 1935 set forth in Pub. L.
No. 74-320, § 32, 49 Stat. 750 (1935), was established four years prior to its implementation.
11. See id.; Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 320-21 (describing commodity distribu-
tion programs legislated under the Agriculture and Food Act of 1935, ch. 641, Pub. L. No. 74-
320, 49 Stat. 774 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030 (1988)), the Agriculture Act of
1949, ch. 792, 63 Stat. 1051 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421 et seq. (1988)), and the
Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 218 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq. (1988)).
12. Agriculture and Food Act, ch. 641, § 32, 49 Stat. 774, 775 (1935) (current version at 7
U.S.C. § 2011-2030 (1988))).
13. Lipsky and Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 320-21.
14. See id. at 319-21.
15. America's hungry provided a depository for the surplus agricultural products the gov-
ernment had purchased to prevent farm prices from dropping due to excessive supply. Id. at
319. The law establishing the first Food Stamp Program reveals that it was the government's
regard for the agriculture industry, rather than the millions of low-income citizens suffering
from hunger and malnutrition, that inspired food assistance legislation. See HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 4. Funds allocated to the first Food Stamp Program were intended to encourage
agricultural exports, re-establish farmers' purchasing power and encourage the domestic con-
sumption of agricultural commodities. Id. The tremendous surplus of dairy products that
resulted from federal price supports prompted the Reagan Administration to re-implement a
commodities program during the early 1980s. See Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 322.
16. HISTORY, supra note 2, at 4.
17. Id.
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first Food Stamp Program began, participants purchased food stamps at a
rate equal to their normal food purchases. 8 Participants then received addi-
tional stamps equalling half the amount purchased.19 The "bonus" stamps,
however, could only be used to purchase surplus food items.20 This restric-
tion was meant to prevent recipients from channeling "food funds" to pay
rent, medical bills or other expenses.21 The early program, however, con-
tained the same flaws as the commodity programs that preceded it.22 That
is, the programs were nutritionally inadequate because of a scarcity of fruits,
vegetables, and meat products.23
Agricultural surpluses swelled again after the Korean War. Efforts were
renewed to deplete these surpluses and provide low-income families with
supplemental food purchasing power. 24 During the mid to late 1950's, Con-
gress introduced a number of bills to establish a food stamp program.25
Although President Eisenhower had the power to authorize implementation
of a food stamp program,26 a program was never approved because the Ad-
ministration thought it would be ineffective and costly.27
Domestic hunger received renewed attention in the 1960's. John F. Ken-
nedy used the problem as one of the foundations for his presidential platform
in 1960.28 Shortly after being inaugurated, he declared that a food stamp
program would begin, initially on a pilot program basis, in order to
"provid[e] additional nutrition to those in need [and thereby] pave the way
for substantial improvement in [the] present method of distributing surplus
food."' 29 The pilot Food Stamp Program of the 1960's, which retained the
purchasing requirement of the earlier programs, 30 reflected a primary and
18. Id. at 5-6.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 5-6.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 322. The Food Stamp Program, as conceived
and implemented in the 1970s, was a reaction to the nutritional deficiencies inherent in the
commodities program. Id. at 321.
23. Id.
24. HISTORY, supra note 2, at 8.
25. See id. at 9-14.
26. See id. at 14-15 (referencing Pub. L. No. 86-341, 73 Stat. 610 (1959) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1431(c)(1988))).
27. See id. at 15. The administration concluded that the food stamp provision would




30. Id. at 16.
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familiar goal: reduction in the level of commodity surpluses by increasing
the food purchasing power of lower income families.3
According to some social policy analysts, domestic hunger became a na-
tional political issue in 1967.32 Senator Robert Kennedy's visit to the im-
poverished Mississippi Delta,33 the widely viewed CBS "Hunger in
America" documentary, 34 and a report entitled "Hunger, USA ' 35 generated
public outcry.36 The needs of low-income citizens came to take precedence
over maintaining agricultural prosperity. 37 Consequently, advocates for the
poor pressed for removal or, at minimum, a reduction of the purchasing
requirement incorporated in the Food Stamp Program.38 Studies revealed
that because some families lacked the necessary cash to purchase monthly
food stamps, the purchasing requirement caused the most desperate house-
holds to receive less assistance than they did under a straight commodities
program.39 The publicity and studies depicting the needs of low-income citi-
zens led to amendment of the Food Stamp Act in 1970.' These amend-
ments eliminated the purchasing requirement for families with gross incomes
of less than $30 per month, established federal eligibility standards, and in-
31. See id. at 16-17. During the 1960s, the Food Stamp Program generated tremendous
debate between legislators who considered the Act to be a welfare program and those who
considered it farm legislation. Id. at 19. For example, Rep. Page Belcher (R-OK) believed the
purpose of the Food Stamp Program was to maintain agricultural prices by decreasing surplus
commodities and, therefore, she saw no reason why a food stamp program was preferable to
direct commodity distribution. Id. Conversely, Rep. Martha Griffiths (D-MI), during a 1964
debate over funding of the Food Stamp Program, stated that she "would not consider the
primary purpose of [the] program to be to use up surpluses." Id.
32. NICK KOTZ, LET THEM EAT PROMISES: THE POLITICS OF HUNGER IN AMERICA xi
(1969).
33. In 1967, a group of United States Senators, physicians, and psychiatrists visited the
Mississippi Delta to observe the effects of racism and a depressed economy on low-income
residents. What they discovered was widespread hunger, malnutrition, and ill-health that ri-
valed the suffering in some Third World countries. See generally GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra
note 5, at 26-28 (describing the positive impacts that post-visit federal nutrition programs had
on the residents of the area).
34. See George McGovern, Foreword to KOTZ, supra note 32, at viii (1969).
35. See HISTORY, supra note 2, at 31. "Hunger, USA" was drafted by the Citizens Board
of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States and was released on April 22,
1969. The Board estimated that between 10 to 14.5 million Americans were underfed and
characterized federal food assistance programs as highly inadequate. Id.
36. See id.
37. See KOTZ, supra note 32, at viii.
38. See HISTORY, supra note 2, at 32.
39. PHYSICIAN TASK FORCE ON HUNGER IN AMERICA, INCREASING HUNGER AND DE-
CLINING HELP: BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION IN THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM 28 (1986)
[hereinafter BARRIERS]. The purchasing requirement mandated that a family pay a minimum
of $10.00 for its monthly food stamp allotment. The most desperate families, those without
cash to pay the purchase price, were thus excluded from the program. Id.
40. See HISTORY, supra note 2, at 37-38
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creased benefit levels.41 The last major changes to the Food Stamp Program
included requiring state participation and eliminating the purchasing re-
quirement.42 Provisions of the Food Stamp Program, such as benefit levels
and eligibility standards, have since undergone minor adjustment.43 A
greater demand on emergency food providers is now one factor inducing
legislators to revise the program further.
B. Resurgence of the Hunger Crisis in the 1980's
During the early 1980's, the poverty rate in the United States increased
20.5%." A high inflation rate, increased unemployment, 45 and the cost-
saving provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
(OBRA) precipitated this increase.46 Rising poverty in the early 1980's
41. Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 325. See generally HISTORY, supra note 2, at 40.
42. Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 325. Mandatory state participation does not
require states to conduct a Food Stamp Program but rather orders participating states to abide
by the Food Stamp Act and its regulations. All states, Washington, D.C., Guam and the
Virgin Islands have a Food Stamp Program. DAVID A. SUPER, FOOD RESEARCH AND AC-
TION CENTER, FRAC's GUIDE TO THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM 8 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter
FRAC's GUIDE].
43. See Lipsky & Thiboudeau, supra note 5, at 325.
44. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 102D CONG., IST SESS. OVER-
VIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS 1388 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter OVERVIEW].
The poverty threshold was first measured by multiplying the price (determined by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture) of the cheapest nutritionally adequate diet by three and adjusting for
various household characteristics such as size and demographics. Id. at 1132. Since 1969, the
poverty threshold has been adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index. Id. at 1133. An
individual's or household's pre-tax income is compared with the poverty threshold to deter-
mine whether they are "poor." It should be noted that inaccurate results may occur when
comparing Census Bureau poverty levels for 1988 and 1989 because the methodology changed
during those years. Id.
For further discussion of the increase in the poverty rate during the 1980's and how the rate
is measured by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics and the Congres-
sional Budget Office, see GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra note 5, at 144.
45. See GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra note 5, at 131-42.
46. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
1645 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). The provisions of OBRA were
expected to reduce federal food stamp spending by $6 billion over three years. HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 119. The Budget Act substantially changed the Food Stamp Program by pro-rating
initial food stamp allotments from the date of application, changing the cost adjustment date
of the Thrifty Food Plan from January 1 to October 1, delaying benefit increases, eliminating
annual indexing, maintaining the deductibility threshold level for medical expenses, and
prohibiting federal funding of outreach programs. See id. at 120-21. The Physician Task
Force on Hunger in America, citing a study conducted in July of 1984 by the Congressional
Research Service, found that the 1981 federal budget cuts caused an additional 560,000 Ameri-
cans to fall below the poverty level. GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra note 5, at 147. The Congres-
sional Budget Office estimated that federal expenditures for human services decreased by an
estimated $110 billion during the early to mid 1980s. Id. at 146 (citing CONGRESSIONAL
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translated into increased hunger and malnutrition.47 The Physician Task
Force on Hunger4 8 found that hunger, after a respite during the mid to late
1970's, was a national problem of epidemic proportions.49 The Task Force
predicted that without drastic policy changes, hunger and malnutrition
would increase, and the already bad situation would worsen as a result of
increased unemployment and cut-backs in federal social services. 50
A year before the Physician Task Force's investigation, the Reagan Ad-
ministration responded to the problem by creating its own thirteen member
Task Force on Food Assistance."' The President's Task Force recom-
mended that existing federal welfare programs, including the Food Stamp
BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, MAJOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN HUMAN RESOURCE
PROGRAMS SINCE JANUARY, 1981 (1983)).
47. Fifteen studies, conducted from 1982 to 1985 by a variety of agencies and organiza-
tions (including the USDA, the United States Conference of Mayors, the Food Research and
Action Center (FRAC), and the Harvard School of Public Health), documented the claim that
there was a "dramatic increase in hunger" in America and that the problem was worsening.
GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra note 5, at 12-17. A technique frequently used to measure hunger
is to survey local emergency food providers to determine whether the number of households
requesting food has increased. Id. at 14-17. For example, in 1983, the Center for Budget and
Policy Priorities surveyed 181 emergency food programs and found that in one third of the
programs, food requests doubled in one year and a "significant portion" of agencies reported
an increase of 200%. Id. at 14. The testimonial evidence compiled and analyzed by the
Physician Task Force on Hunger in America has been held reliable and highly persuasive by
legislators, public health officials, and community service organizations interested in hunger
and malnutrition.
Poverty, however, is not the only cause of hunger. See SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, supra note 5, at
27. Other factors include: abuse of natural resources, which diminishes the supply of food,
high energy costs, policy decisions that cater to corporate interests, and a deteriorating food
distribution system. See id. at 27-31.
48. The Physician Task Force on Hunger in America came into existence in 1984. Its
members include physicians and academicians who are experts in nutrition, pediatrics, and
public health. Id. at 6. The goals of the Task Force have been articulated as follows:
Document to the extent possible the nature and scope of the problem of hunger,
particularly how widespread hunger is and what groups of Americans are hungry;
Analyze any regional variations in the problem of hunger, and identify any com-
mon threads in the picture of hunger across the regions of the nation;
Assess the health effects of hunger, especially among high-risk groups such as chil-
dren, pregnant women, and the elderly;
Determine why hunger is a problem, and make recommendations to remedy the
problem and, if possible, prevent it from recurring. Id.
49. Id. at 25; see SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, supra note 5, at 90 (quoting a food stamp supervisor
who observed that an increasing number of middle income households are applying for food
stamp benefits).
50. See id. at 8-10.
51. See HISTORY, supra note 2, at 149. The President's Task Force, created by executive
order on September 8, 1983, evaluated the effectiveness of federal food assistance programs,
which included the Food Stamp Program and the School Breakfast and Lunch programs. Id.
at 149-50.
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Program, undergo reform.5 2 Few of the President's Task Force's recom-
mendations were ever acted upon, 53 although Congress did propose incre-
mental increases in benefit levels.
5 4
Concurrently, Congress made eliminating ineligible recipients and eradi-
cating over-issuance a legislative priority. 55 It adopted rigorous income ver-
ification provisions, requiring applicants to supply Social Security numbers
to program administrators who then had to verify income amounts with the
Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, and the appli-
cant's employer. States that exceeded the national error rate for providing
benefits to ineligibles had to reimburse the federal government. 56 State pen-
alties increased when the federal government reduced the acceptable level of
error during the Reagan era. States reacted by implementing more burden-
some verification requirements,5 7 which discouraged eligible households
from participating in the program.5 ' The certification process has, as a re-
52. Id. at 152-53. Three of the President's Task Force's nine recommendations included
easing eligibility requirements by raising the asset limit and automobile exemption, insuring
the eligibility of homeless individuals, and facilitating participation by simplifying the food
stamp application.
53. Id. at 153. Only one of the President's Task Force recommendation was enacted. In
1984, food stamp allotment was raised from 99% of the cost of the Thrifty Food Plan to
100%. Id. at 152. Although the House passed a bill that incorporated the bulk of the Presi-
dent's Task Force's proposals, the Senate declined to enact the measure because it would have
increased program costs. Id.
54. See id. at 155-61; David B. Neumeyer, Developments in Food Program Legislation and
Case Law in 1986, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1267, 1268-69 (1987). This statement, describ-
ing the legislative efforts during the later half of the 1980s, is a generalization to which there
are exceptions. For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207 (1986), extended eligibility to a particularly desperate group by permitting individuals
living in emergency shelters to receive food stamps even though the facility provided them
with meals. Id. at 1269.
55. HISTORY, supra note 2, at 277.
56. See id. at 277-79 (describing the purpose and operation of quality control and the
error rate sanction system). Under a quality control system, the Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS) monitors welfare agencies. By reviewing a statistically valid number of cases, the FNS
determines the amount of erroneously issued food stamp benefits. The federal government
then sanctions states that have excessive error rates. See id.
57. Lipsky & Thibideau, supra note 5, at 329-30.
58. See id. at 330-31. To avoid the higher penalties exacted by the federal government for
over-issuance, states have implemented complex application procedures. Persons who cannot
provide the required documentation regarding household income, assets, and expenses are ex-
cluded from the program. In addition, a complicated application process makes the program
more expensive to administer. See id. In terms of complexity, the food stamp certification
process has been equated with the federal income tax long form. BARRIERS, supra note 39, at
135. Some policy analysts question whether such an extensive verification process is cost-
effective in preventing the erroneous disbursement of benefits. Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note
5, at 331.
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suit, become a "bureaucratic maze." 59 The admonitions and advice ex-
pounded by the Physician Task Force' have not yet been followed and
evidence shows that the problem of domestic hunger and under-nutrition is
worsening.6"
1. Evidence of Domestic Hunger Among Low Income Families with
Dependant Children
Unemployment, ill-health, and extreme poverty render three classes, chil-
dren, the elderly and the homeless62 particularly vulnerable to hunger.63
Childhood hunger and under-nutrition in particular is generating great at-
tention in Congress."M Advocates for the poor, who are lobbying for food
stamp reform, characterize the Food Stamp Program as an agenda to im-
59. BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 134-35; see also infra text accompanying notes 125-28
(describing the error rate sanction system as a "barrier to participation" because it effectually
limits access to the Food Stamp Program).
60. GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra note 5, at 177-79. The recommendations of the Physician
Task Force include: improving the Food Stamp Program (e.g., increase food stamp benefits,
modify asset and deduction restrictions, end administrative policies that prevent eligible per-
sons from participating in the program); creating an independent monitoring group that would
provide current data regarding the nutritional status of the population, particularly the health
of pregnant women, children, and the elderly; and establishing a congressional commission
that would study the causes of hunger and recommend further legislative changes.
61. See FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMUNITY
CHILDHOOD HUNGER IDENTIFICATION PROJECT (1991) [hereinafter CCHIP SUMMARY] (re-
porting the conclusions of CCHIP hunger surveys conducted in seven American cities). See
generally SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, supra note 5, at 26-28, 103-09. Schwartz-Nobel describes the
spread of hunger in the United States and declares that the general public remains ignorant
because of policymakers' "short-term solutions, gimmicks, and unrealistic promises." Id. at
30.
62. See generally LYNN PARKER AND STUART HIRSCHFELD, FOOD RESEARCH AND AC-
TION CENTER, FOOD STAMP FACTS 4-6 (1991) [hereinafter FRAC's FACTS] (profiling a food
stamp recipient).
63. See BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 20-22 (correlating Food Stamp Program eligibility
with hunger and concluding that those with few economic resources are most likely to suffer
from a food shortage).
64. See Hearing on Childhood Hunger Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Con-
sumer Relations and Nutrition of the House Comm. on Agric., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991)
[hereinafter FRAC Childhood Hunger Testimony] (testimony of Robert J. Fersh, Executive
Director, Food Research and Action Center). FRAC estimates that over 90% of the assist-
ance provided in the Mickey Leland Childhood Hunger Relief Act is for low-income families
with children. Id. Other legislative measures currently pending in Congress and directed at
improving infant and childhood food assistance programs include: the Childhood Hunger Pre-
vention Act of 1991 (S. 602), the WIC Infant Feeding Initiative Act of 1991 (S. 657 and H.R.
1441), the World Summit for Children Implementation Act of 1991 (H.R. 1633, S. 878), and
the Freedom from Want Act (H.R. 2258). See Hearing on Hunger in America Before the
Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition of the House Comm. on
Agric., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991) [hereinafter National PTA Hunger Testimony] (testi-
mony of Arlene Zielke, Vice President for Legislative Activity, National PTA).
19921
Catholic University Law Review
prove child nutrition.6 5 These individuals support their position by citing
the statistic that, in the United States, an estimated 5.5 million prepubescent
children are hungry and an additional six million are at risk of hunger.66
Further, they contend that today, one in four American children under the
age of twelve is hungry or at risk of hunger.6 7
65. See, e.g., FRAC Childhood Hunger Testimony, supra note 64, at 3. Widely quoted
data shows that children comprise the largest class of food stamp recipients, over 50%, and
that nationally over 83% of food stamp recipients are households with dependent children. Id.
66. See id. at 2. FRAC continues to coordinate the Community Childhood Hunger Iden-
tification Project (CCHIP), a study devised by nutrition and epidemiology experts that is
meant to "providefl a sound basis for estimating the number of children under age 12 who are
hungry or at risk of hunger nationally." Id. at 1-2. "Hunger" results from not ingesting an
adequate amount of calories, protein or other nutrients needed to resist disease, develop physi-
cally and mentally, and function productively. See Hearing on Childhood Hunger in America
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition of the House
Comm. on Agric., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter AAP Childhood Hunger Testi-
mony] (testimony by Dr. Ronald Kleinman, American Academy of Pediatrics). But see Rob-
ert Rector, Food Fight: How Hungry Are America's Children?, POL'Y REV., Fall 1991, at 38.
In a recent article, Robert Rector attacks FRAC's CCHIP survey results as being unsound,
stating that the survey lacks a scientific basis because low-income families were questioned
about their food intake. No actual measurement of food or nutrient consumption was taken.
See id. Rector declares that studies conducted by USDA and Health and Human Services do
not demonstrate widespread hunger and under-nutrition. See id. at 43. The Center for Dis-
ease Control study Rector relies on, the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey II
(NHANES II), is also referenced by the Physician Task Force on Hunger in America. See
GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra note 5, at 103-07. Contrary to Rector's interpretation, however,
the Physician Task Force states that NHANES II showed that a greater percentage of low-
income individuals consume inadequate calories, vitamin C, and iron. Id. at 104. Further-
more, the Physician Task Force cited a USDA study, Nationwide Food Consumption Survey
(NFCS), for the finding that only 12% of households participating in the Food Stamp Pro-
gram were able to meet the Recommended Daily Allowances established by the National
Academy of Sciences. Id. at 105. Asserting that "[t]he poor do not suffer from food
shortages," Rector, supra, at 43, Rector does not acknowledge the numerous studies and com-
pelling testimonial evidence compiled by federal, state and city governments, universities, reli-
gious organizations, and advocacy groups demonstrating that domestic hunger and under-
nutrition is a current and profound problem. See GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra note 5, at 12-13,
25. Interestingly, Rector does not advocate extinguishing the Food Stamp Program but in-
stead proposes utilizing the program to provide low-income women and children with mineral
supplements. See Rector, supra, at 43.
67. See FRAC Childhood Hunger Testimony, supra note 64, at 2. James D. Weill, in his
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and
Nutrition, made this statistic less abstract by stating that "more children are hungry in the
United States than there are total children in such countries as Romania, Somalia, Haiti,
Zimbabwe, El Salvador, or Cambodia." Hearing on Hunger in America: Children, Working
Families, and Implications for the Future Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Con-
sumer Relations and Nutrition of the House Comm. on Agric., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. Summary
(1991) [hereinafter Defense Fund Hunger Testimony] (testimony of James D. Weill, General
Counsel, Children's Defense Fund) (emphasis added).
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2. Effects of Hunger: Why Domestic Hunger is a National Crisis
Ample evidence of widespread hunger and under-nutrition among chil-
dren in the United States6" justifies identifying domestic hunger as one of the
most deleterious problems facing our nation.69 Opponents of social welfare
programs have long argued that federal and state welfare programs are
fraught with fraud and are ultimately harmful.7 ° These opponents also con-
tend that federal assistance deprives low-income citizens of their indepen-
dence.7 These arguments, however, are particularly unsound with respect
68. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER
AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1991 at 7 (1991) (stating that the demand for
emergency food assistance by families with children increased by an estimated 26 percent dur-
ing 1991 and that an estimated 17 percent of all requests were not met).
69. Domestic hunger is a problem distinct from the issue of world hunger. The United
States' past and future efforts to abate global hunger, particularly with regard to military or
ideological opponents, are much debated. See PAUL SIMON, THE GLASS HOUSE: POLITICS &
MORALITY IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL 63 (1984). During recessionary periods, some United
States legislators have responded to their constituents' economic fears by admonishing the
federal government for sending tax payers' dollars overseas. See id. at 63-64.
Advocates for United States' involvement in international hunger problems present cautious
proposals. For example, with regard to the former Soviet Union, it has been advised that the
United States provide a "reform agenda" as opposed to simply giving money or food. Robert
J. Samuelson, Now, Let's Aid the Soviets, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1991, at A25. Advocates argue
that without some semblance of a market economy and an organized, non-corrupt trading
system, farmers will not be encouraged to produce more and, as a result, hoarding and spoilage
will continue. Id. But see Desperate need, desperate deed, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1992, at 14,
for the argument that Somalia should be provided with food assistance regardless of the fact
that much of it will be stolen by the warlords and bandits.
70. See HISTORY, supra note 2, at 29. In 1968, congressional opponents of the Food
Stamp Program argued against extending authorization, alleging that "hippies" and married
college students supported by their parents received food stamp benefits. See ROBERT REC-
TOR & MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSERVATIVE'S GUIDE To STATE-LEVEL WELFARE
REFORM (available from the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.). Rector and McLaugh-
lin assert that welfare programs "erodeal the essential moral fabric." Id. at 1. They contend
that most public assistance programs are formulated to reduce "material" poverty but have the
effect of increasing "behavioral" poverty, which they define as the deterioration of social
norms and ethics. Id. at 5, 11-12. But see infra note I ll and accompanying text (describing
misconceptions regarding the Food Stamp Program and the inaccurate stereotype of food
stamp recipients). Moreover, recent studies of the Food Stamp Program reveal no evidence
that fraud is a substantial problem. Errors by applicants, recipients and case workers are
shown to be largely unintentional. See FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 33.
71. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 227-29 (1984). Mr. Murray suggests that
"scrapping the entire federal welfare and income-support structure," id. at 227, would cause it
to become "highly dysfunctional for a person to be dependent." Id. at 229. He concludes that
"[n]on-economic rewards [would then] reinforce the economic rewards of being a good parent
and provider." Id. Theoretically, the proposed plan would improve the lives of working-age
persons. Admittedly, however, the plan would not benefit those who are unable to enter the
workforce. See id. at 233. The proposal places tremendous reliance on philanthropy, ex-
horting that the federal government should simply "let a hundred flowers bloom." See id. at
232. The notion that philanthropy alone can provide the level of assistance needed to abate
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to children, the largest recipient class of food stamps. Children participate
in the work force at a level limited by the law and therefore are, by defini-
tion, a class unable to assert economic independence.72
Aside from the humanitarian rationale for ending domestic hunger, eco-
nomic pragmatism reveals that domestic hunger should be a national prior-
ity. For example, performance studies of children suffering from hunger
73
indicate that such children do not excel academically because they cannot
concentrate and are often absent as a result of hunger-related illnesses.7 4
The Committee for Economic Development found that almost 40% of pre-
schoolers face serious risk of academic failure due, in part, to an inadequate
diet." The American Academy of Pediatrics recently found that malnutri-
tion during childhood permanently diminishes intellectual abilities, produces
sociopathic behavior, and causes a weakened physical condition.76 Futher,
these afflictions occur in children who have an inadequate diet for only a
short time.7 7 Implementing an effective food assistance program is likely to
improve the mental and physical abilities of children from low-income fami-
lies and is therefore as much a strategy for maintaining national security and
competitiveness as it is an expression of humanitarianism.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
A. Overview of the Current Provisions and Goals
of the Food Stamp Program
The Food Stamp Act of 1964, by expanding and making the Food Stamp
Program permanent, increased the nutrition of low-income persons and im-
domestic hunger is disputed by data showing that public and privately funded food assistance
programs are unable to keep up with demand. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAY-
ORS, supra note 68, at 20-23 (1991). In Norfolk, Virginia, for example, it was reported that
"[s]upply has not kept pace with demand. There has been a volunteer shortage in staffing food
pantries and soup kitchens." Id.
72. See generally 137 CONG. REC. H5808-12 (daily ed. July 24, 1991) (statements of Reps.
Bacchus, Emerson, and Towns) (articulating the particular depravity of permitting children to
suffer from hunger).
73. See National PTA Hunger Testimony, supra note 64, at 4-5.
74. Id.
75. Hearing on Nutrition for Children Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Con-
sumer Relations and Nutrition of the House Comm. on Agric., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991)
[hereinafter CED's Nutrition Testimony] (testimony by Nathaniel M. Semple, Vice President
and Secretary, Committee for Economic Development). The 40% of the nation's children who
CED characterizes as being "at serious risk of education failure" include children who are
deprived of either pre-natal care, immunizations, pre-school education, or a nutritionally bal-
anced diet.
76. AAP Childhood Hunger Testimony, supra note 66, at 4-7.
77. Id. at 7.
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proved the surplus food distribution system.78 The Food Stamp Act of
197779 and its subsequent amendments8° established the Food Stamp Pro-
gram as it exists today. As the federal government's most developed strategy
for battling our hunger problem, 8 the purpose of the Food Stamp Program
is to "increas[e] the food purchasing power" of low-income households,
thereby abating domestic hunger and promoting the nation's general health
and welfare.
8 2
The Food Stamp Program is presently the federal government's most ex-
tensive vehicle for providing food assistance to persons with low-incomes.8 3
The Program furnishes coupons that can be exchanged for food to those who
qualify for cash assistance," as well s to some low-income households that
78. See HISTORY, supra note 2, at 21. Under the 1964 Act, the Federal Government
established benefit levels and paid the entire cost of food stamp benefits including all federal
administrative costs. State and local governments set eligibility standards and paid approxi-
mately 70% of the program's non-federal administrative costs, Id. at 21.
79. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029 (1988).
80. See generally HISTORY, supra note 2 at 78-89 (summarizing events surrounding repeal
of the 1964 Food Stamp Act and enactment of a revised Food Stamp Act as part of the 1977
farm bill).
81. See generally id. (describing the goals and drastic revisions to the 1964 Act).
82. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988).
83. JOE RICHARDSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, How THE FOOD STAMP
PROGRAM WORKS 1-3 (1 1th ed. 1989) [hereinafter CRS, FOOD STAMP PROGRAM REPORT].
The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), part of the United States Department of Agriculture,
administers the Food Stamp Program. The federal government funds all food stamp benefits
and a portion of the program's administrative costs. See OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1387.
All fifty states have chosen to offer the program. States are responsible for administering the
program and providing approximately 50% of the administrative costs, but must comply with
federal rules. See id. at 1385-86. States are also responsible for ensuring that program partici-
pants are truly eligible and receive an accurate amount of benefits. States conduct federally
mandated quality control reviews to determine and reduce error rates. Sanctions are levied
against states whose rate of over-issuance exceeds the nationally established maximum. See
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 277-79. Several provisions of the Hunger Prevention Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-435, 102 Stat. 1645 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.), revised the sanction system, reducing the amount of sanctions issued.
84. See generally ISSAC SHAPIRO, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES ET AL.,
THE STATES AND THE POOR: How BUDGET DECISIONS IN 1991 AFFECTED Low INCOME
PEOPLE 7 (1991) (distinguishing cash and non-cash assistance programs). Federal and state
governments provide low-income persons with cash and non-cash assistance. Cash assistance
programs include: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which assists families
with young children; the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI), the main cash assist-
ance program for low-income elderly and disabled persons; and General Assistance, which
serves poor persons who are not eligible to receive AFDC or SSI. Id. States also supply needy
individuals with short-term monetary aid through Emergency Assistance programs. Id.
Two non-cash, health-related assistance programs include the Food Stamp Program and the
Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). WIC targets
low-income pregnant and post-partum women, infants and children under age five who are at
risk nutritionally. Id. at 31. WIC participants receive checks that may be reimbursed for
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do no meet the eligibility requirements of cash welfare programs. 85 For the
working poor, food stamps are the main source of federal aid.8 6
Federal funding of the Food Stamp Program in 1991 totaled $19.6 bil-
lion.8 7 A household's gross income determines eligibility.8 8 With the excep-
tion of households having one or more elderly or disabled members,
participants' gross income cannot exceed 130% of the poverty line 9 and
their assets cannot exceed $2,000.90 If the household has one or more eld-
erly members, the asset limit increases to $3,000.91 Unless exempted, par-
ticipants must either work or register for employment, 92 with employment-
training programs mandatory for some participants.93
B. Meritorious Features of the Food Stamp Program
Food Research and Action Center, a research and advocacy organization
that analyzes public policies affecting domestic hunger and malnutrition, ob-
serves that "[t]he Food Stamp Program has been very successful in reaching
specific types and quantities of foods (such as dairy products) and are counseled on proper
nutrition. Id. at 42.
85. E.g., Defense Fund Hunger Testimony, supra note 67, at 8 (stating that food stamps
are especially important to poor working families and have narrowed the "nutritional gap").
86. Id. Two-parent households in which at least one parent is working are unlikely to
qualify for AFDC. See id.
87. FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 2. After reductions made by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, federal funding of the Food Stamp Program has increased gradu-
ally. In 1982, the federal government funded the program at a level of $11.12 billion. The
estimated federal funding in 1990 was $16.52 billion. Adjusting these figures for inflation, the
Food Stamp Program has received a net increase of $1.65 billion of federal dollars during this
period. Food stamp expenditures currently comprise approximately 1.4% of the total federal
budget. Id. at 2-3; see also OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1388.
88. OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1390. "Gross income" includes all monetary income
except income received for the care of a person outside the household, income earned by
schoolchildren and excludes education-related expenses. Id. Households receiving AFDC or
SSI are, in almost all cases, automatically eligible. The amount of benefits received is based on
the household's monthly cash income. Id.
89. Id. at 1392. Based on this formula, the gross monthly income eligibility limit for one
person residing in any one of the 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, Guam or the
Virgin Islands equalled $681 for the period of October 1990 through September 1991. For a
food stamp household consisting of two persons, the limit was $913. Id
90. "Assets" used for food stamp eligibility determination include cash, bank accounts,
stocks and bonds, inheritances, individual retirement accounts, Keogh plans, insurance settle-
ment payments, income tax refunds, and the market value of a car in excess of $4,500. CRS,
FOOD STAMP PROGRAM, supra note 83, at 40.
91. FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 7.
92. Id. at 13. A food stamp recipient is exempt from work requirements if over the age of
60, under the age of 18, or disabled. Some students, residents of drug or alcohol treatment
centers, and people who care for one or more children under school age are also exempt.
Twenty-one percent of all participants are not exempt from the work requirements. Id.
93. Id.
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many of the poorest Americans and in making a significant difference in the
nutritional adequacy of their diets."' 94 Government research demonstrates
the program's positive impact on the nutritional status of low-income citi-
zens. 95 The USDA reported in 1990 that the diet of a household, after enter-
ing the Food Stamp Program, contains a greater amount of the
Recommended Daily Allowances (RDA)96 of nutrients.97
Data also indicates that the Food Stamp Program is economically efficient
to the degree that it provides assistance to those with the greatest need.98
During fiscal years 1987 through 1990, 83 to 85% of federal monies desig-
nated for the Food Stamp Program were applied toward actual benefits as
opposed to administrative costs.99 Regulations barring strikers, aliens, col-
lege students, and persons who have left their jobs without "good cause"
minimize program costs.'°° The program contains a stringent review system
94. FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at ii. FRAC, however, ardently advocates Food
Stamp Program reform and cites insufficient benefit levels and barriers to participation as fac-
tors that contribute to the nation's failure to abate domestic hunger. See CCHIP SUMMARY,
supra note 61, at Introduction. FRAC is an active proponent of the Mickey Leland Childhood
Hunger Relief Act. See, e.g., Finance and Ways and Means Committee Key to Fate of Child-
hood Hunger Relief Legislation, Oct. 25, 1991 [hereinafter "FRAC Leland Bill Release"]
(available from FRAC, Washington, D.C.).
95. See JOYcE E. ALLEN & KENNETH E. GADSON, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NUTRIENT
CONSUMPTION PAi-rERNS OF Low-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 29 (1983).
96. Recommended Daily Allowances are the Food and Nutrition Board's recommenda-
tions concerning daily intake of specific nutrients. The Board is part of the National Academy
of Sciences. See GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra note 5, at 215.
97. FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 18. But see HISTORY, supra note 2, at 323 (discuss-
ing Congressional Budget Office studies that are inconclusive as to whether increased food
purchases result in the purchasing household obtaining a more nutritious diet). The Senate
Agriculture Committee has questioned the underlying assumption that nutritional status and
income level are consistently causally related-a premise that strikes at the heart of the Food
Stamp Act. Id. at 331. The Committee concedes, however, that the nutrition level of a house-
hold increases after participation in the Food Stamp Program begins. Id. at 331-32. The
nutrient level of a household, upon entry into the program, increases by 7 to 29%. FRAC's
FACTS, supra note 62, at 18.
98. See OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1392-95 (outlining eligibility requirements).
99. See OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1388 (table 3, "Recent Food Stamp Expenditures");
see also FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 18.
100. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.1-273.7 (1990). The regulations include exceptions that allow
some members of these classes to receive food stamps. Some of the exceptions are: college
students who attend school under the Job Training Partnership Act and meet all other require-
ments, id. at § 273.5(b)(vi); legal aliens who have been granted permanent residence, id. at
§ 273.4(2); and strikers who have been locked-out, id. at § 273.1(g)(2)(i). Note, however, that
a striker's entire family is affected if the striking member does not qualify under one of the
exceptions. Id.; see Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 371 (1988) (holding that Congress' denial of
food stamps to the households of striking workers was rationally related to the legitimate
government interest of avoiding favoritism with regard to labor disputes). But see Gerald R.
Weber, Jr., Note, The Striker Amendment to the Food Stamp Act: Politics Chipping Away at the
Union, Family, and Social Welfare, 22 GA. L. REV. 741 (1988) (asserting that the striker
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and rigorous application and reporting requirements to insure that only eli-
gible households receive benefits.101
While states cannot enact food stamp rules or procedures that conflict
with federal laws,' ° 2 the Food Stamp Program is flexible when dealing with
state-run nutrition programs. The Act permits states to grant child support
deductions and conduct demonstration projects, employment programs, and
outreach programs.' °3 Supplying states with these elective provisions en-
courages the development of effective innovations to help low-income fami-
lies supplement their diets. "
C. Defects in the Food Stamp Program 105
1. Barriers to Participation: "Bureaucratic Disentitlement"
Low participation rates' 0 6 have plagued the Food Stamp Program since
its inception.'o7 A household's characteristics effect the likelihood of partic-
amendment inhibits the government's goal of remaining neutral and violates the constitutional
rights of the striker, the striker's family, and the individual's union).
101. See FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 35-36.
102. See Harrington v. Blum, 483 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 693 F.2d 768 (2d
Cir. 1980). In Harrington, the court held that when a state implements an optional policy it
may not issue companion regulations that in any way conflict with federal law. Id. at 1019.
103. See OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1387. For example, a state that elects to invoke the
child support payment option calculates the income of the recipient-parent by disregarding the
first $50 in child support that a parent receives.
104. See id.
105. A substantial flaw in the Food Stamp Program is the use of the Thrifty Food Plan
(TFP) to determine maximum food stamp benefit levels. See Mary Ellen Natale & David A.
Super, The Case Against the Thrifty Food Plan as the Basis for Food Component of the AFDC
Standard of Need, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 86, 88 (1991). The TFP is USDA's estimate of
the cost needed to sustain a family of four, presuming that the household spends 30% of its
income on food. Food stamp benefits are currently set at 103% of the TFP. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(o)
(1988). At this level, a participating household receives, on average, benefits of $.71 per person
per meal. See OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1395. The benefit levels derived from the TFP are
widely criticized as nutritionally deficient and economically inaccurate. See Natale & Super,
supra at 89; see also Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 325-26 (describing the minimal
adjustments made to benefit levels since 1965).
This Comment, in discussing the Food Stamp Program's defects, focuses on the policies that
prevent participation in the Food Stamp Program rather than on the inadequacies of the
Program's provisions. Studies show that low benefit levels themselves do not hinder
participation because they do not discourage needy persons from applying. See Richard D.
Coe, Non-participation in Welfare Programs By Eligible Households: The Case of the Food
Stamp Program, 17 J. EcON. ISSUES 1035, 1039-40 (1983).
106. "Participation rate" is the number of households participating in the Food Stamp
Program divided by the number of eligible households. GAO, Food Stamp Program: A Demo-
graphic Analysis of Participation and Nonparticipation 11 n. 1 (1990) [hereinafter GAO, Partici-
pation Analysis].
107. Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 326. See generally CHRISTIAN K. RANNEY &
JOHN E. KUSHMAN, GIANNINI FOUND. OF AGRIC. ECON., A STUDY OF INTERDEPENDENT
[Vol. 41:421
Reformation of the Food Stamp Act
ipation. I08 The Government Accounting Office reports that only 43.8% of
eligible households"° participate in the Food Stamp Program."' Further-
more, although poverty has increased in recent years, participation rates
have declined."' Many factors explain this phenomenon. Factors that in-
FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND FOOD DEMAND DECISIONS 15-20 (Mar. 1987)
(presenting a theoretical model of Food Stamp Program participation and food expenditure
decisions for the purpose of improving program design, budgeting and implementation).
108. Distinguishing characteristics include age, sex, marital status, welfare status, employ-
ment status, race, residence in an urban or rural locale, number of children or elderly members
present in the household, and education level. See Coe, supra note 105, at 1040-43.
109. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) conducts screening tests to estimate the
number of eligible households. The tests juxtapose income and asset levels against responses
provided by Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) surveys. PSID surveys are conducted
by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. GAO, Participation Analysis,
supra note 106, at 8 n. 1, 9 n.2. PSID data is used extensively by other agencies and individual
economists to measure participation levels in welfare programs. See, e.g., Coe, supra note 105,
at 1036 (utilizing PSID data to determine why some eligible households do not use food
stamps).
110. GAO, Participation Analysis, supra note 106, at 11. A precise measurement of the
number of Food Stamp Program participants and the number of eligible households is difficult
to obtain. FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 29 n.7. As one would expect, different methods
result in different calculations. For instance, CBO estimated the participation rate of eligible
households to be between 41 and 58% in August 1984, while USDA arrived at a figure of 60%
for this same time period. Id. at 27. Citing data from a 1984 report filed by the President's
Task Force on Food Assistance, the Physician Task Force on Hunger in America states that
40-45% of eligible households are not participating in the Food Stamp Program. BARRIERS,
supra note 39, at 22. Although agencies, organizations, and individuals cite slightly different
statistics when discussing participation rates, all sources indicate that in recent years participa-
tion in relation to eligibility has declined while the poverty level has risen.
111. See FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 27; see also OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1401.
See generally BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 7-8 (describing the Physician Task Force's purpose
during its field investigation as answering the question: "Why is food stamp coverage declining
at a time in which hunger is increasing?"). Amendments to the Food Stamp Act enacted
during the early to mid 1970s caused participation to increase sharply. See supra notes 41-42
and accompanying text (discussing, for example, the standardization of benefits and revocation
of the purchasing requirement during 1971-1973); see also BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 26
(presenting statistical evidence that participation in the Food Stamp Program increased by 5
million people during this period). This "welfare explosion" causes many to erroneously be-
lieve that welfare benefits such as food stamps are overissued. Coe, supra note 105, at 1035.
The incorrect assumption that a significant number of ineligible or non-needy persons receive
food stamp benefits is one of several misconceptions that frustrates efforts to extend food stamp
benefits. See FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at i. Misconceptions about the Food Stamp Pro-
gram include the belief that many recipients are vigorous, employable individuals when, in
reality, approximately 50% of food stamp recipients are children and 87% are women and
their children, elderly or disabled persons. Id. Another misconception is that many partici-
pants use food stamps to supplement an adequate income. The Food Stamp Act sets stringent
income and asset levels. The gross income level of 92% of participating households is at or
below poverty level. Id. In 1981, USDA reported that 96% of all food stamp households had
less than $500 in assets. BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 20-21. Benefits under the program are
neither comprehensive nor necessarily long-term. See supra note 105 (describing the formula
used to set benefit levels). USDA reported in 1988 that half of recipient households remain in
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hibit full participation include inadequate or inaccurate information, 112inac-
cessibility of food stamp offices (the location where application process
occurs),' 13 and hostility towards applicants and participants.' 14 A particu-
larly vexing barrier, however, is the phenomenon of "bureaucratic disentitle-
the program for less than seven months. FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 16. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that either food stamp recipients or food stamp administrators or office
employees readily participate in fraudulent activities. Id. at 34. See generally THEODORE R.
MARMOR, AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING
REALITIES (1990) (describing the flawed conclusion, held by many Americans, that welfare
programs of the 1970's caused the economic problems of the 1980's).
The current recession has caused the number of persons utilizing public assistance, including
food stamp benefits, to increase. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note
68, at 8; SHAPIRO, supra note 84, at vii (reporting that the economic downturn, and resulting
unemployment, has caused state revenues to decrease and requests for public assistance to
rise); Welfare Paradox, WASH. POST, July 29, 1991, at A10. However, since the number of
persons eligible to receive food stamp benefits has also increased, under-participation persists.
See 137 CONG. REC. H5811-12 (daily ed. July 24, 1991) (statements of Rep. Penny and Rep.
Coyne).
112. Data compiled by PSID shows that both a lack of information and misinformation
about the Food Stamp Program and its eligibility requirements pose the greatest barrier to
participation. Coe, supra note 105, at 1038-39. PSID's study showed that approximately 40%
of eligible persons did not participate in the program because they did not know they were
eligible. An additional 11% of eligible non-participants knew about the program but were
incorrectly informed by welfare officials that they were ineligible. Id. For this reason, Profes-
sor Coe concludes that poor information concerning eligibility and the application process is
"one of the principle barriers to food stamp participation." BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 62.
Outreach program expenditures, a vehicle by which individuals are informed about the
Food Stamp Program, were eliminated by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
(OBRA), Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 1645 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.). See supra note 46 (summarizing OBRA's effect on the Food Stamp Program); see
also BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 60. See generally HISTORY, supra note 2, at 113-22 (discuss-
ing cost cutting measures implemented by the Reagan administration); OVERVIEW, supra note
44, at 1401 (discussing cost cutting measures invoked during the 1980s). Although the Hunger
Prevention Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-435, 102 Stat. 1645 (1988) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.), contained an outreach program provision, its requirement that
states provide 50% of the funding for outreach activities precludes municipalities experiencing
budgetary difficulties from re-implementing outreach programs. See D.C. Hunger Action, The
D.C Food Stamp System: A Fact-Finding Investigation Conducted by D.C. Hunger Action 1
(Sept. 1989) [hereinafter D.C. Hunger Action, The D.C. Food Stamp System] (available from
D.C. Hunger Action, Washington, D.C.). See generally BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 65
(describing the difficulties welfare departments located in rural and economically depressed
areas have in attempting to conduct outreach without the aid of federal funds.). But see OVER-
VIEW, supra note 44, at 1402 (discussing 1988-89 legislation that expanded benefits and liberal-
ized eligibility requirements).
113. See Coe, supra note 105, at 1037.
114. Id. at 1037-38. For purposes of his analysis, Coe organizes the explanations for low
participation into five categories: "(1) Informational Problems; (2) Problems with Program
Parameters; (3) Administrative Problems; (4) Physical Access Problems; and (5) Attitudinal
Factors." Id. at 1037. Very few eligible persons elect not to receive food stamps assessing the
value of the benefits to be inadequate. Id. at 1039-40.
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ment."' 5 Regulatory changes, their substance as well as their number," 6
constitute bureaucratic disentitlement." 7
Monthly Reporting and Retrospective Budgeting (MRRB)' 18 is an exam-
ple of how the federal government, under the pretense of increasing the effec-
tiveness of the Food Stamp Program, actually prevents eligible recipients
from receiving benefits. "9 During the period a recipient is certified to re-
115. Bureaucratic disentitlement is caused by federal administrative requirements and local
discretionary policies that require applicants and recipients to furnish more information or
documentary proof than federal law requires. Bureaucratic disentitlements also take the form
of harsher sanctions for unintentional errors and omissions. See Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra
note 5, at 330.
116. See id. Errors by state food stamp officials that result in eligible households being
excluded from the Food Stamp Program have been largely attributed to overly complicated
federal regulations. BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 11. Noting that over two hundred regula-
tory changes to the Food Stamp Act were introduced during the past decade, Lipsky and
Thibodeau imply that such legislative revisions exacerbate error rates rather than disburse
benefits more equitably and efficiently. Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 330.
117. Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 330.
118. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 made monthly reporting a
mandatory feature of the Food Stamp Program in August of 1981. See ROBERT GREENSTEIN
& MARION E. NICHOLS, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, MONTHLY REPORT-
ING: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 8 (1989) [hereinafter REVIEW OF MONTHLY
REPORTING] (analyzing MRRB and summarizing the findings from federally funded monthly
reporting demonstration projects conducted in Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
and New York). The alleged goal of the monthly reporting provision was to curtail over-
issuance. HISTORY, supra note 2, at 147. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), advocating the imple-
mentation of mandatory monthly reporting, stated that "households with income and those
most likely to have income, should be targeted for more timely and accurate reporting of their
income." Id. The Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-435, 102 Stat. 1645 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.), permitted states to implement MRRB on an
optional rather than mandatory basis. See REVIEW OF MONTHLY REPORTING, supra, at 1, 9.
Retrospective budgeting, rather than prospective budgeting, is used in conjunction with
monthly reporting as a means of lowering program costs. See id. at 17-18. Utilizing retrospec-
tive budgeting, case workers evaluate a household's monthly eligibility and benefit level based
on income, assets and circumstances associated with the previous month. See CRS, FOOD
STAMP PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 83, at 14.
119. An evaluation of MRRB demonstration programs was held to "indicate that the sys-
tem fails to reduce error rates and costs .... MRRB is associated with increased costs in
several of the states evaluated, and increased errors in still others." BARRIERS, supra note 39,
at 100 (emphasis added). USDA Regional Food and Nutrition Service and state officials have
contended that basing eligibility and benefit amounts on a household's average monthly in-
come, rather than on actual monthly income provided by monthly reporting, "reduces pro-
gram costs... [by] mak[ing] the program easier to administer," GAO, Food Stamp Program:
Administrative Hindrances to Participation, 36 (Oct. 1988) [hereinafter GAO, Administrative
Hindrances], and provides "food stamp recipients a standard monthly benefit which allows
them to budget their resources better." Id. at 37. Monthly reporting has been described as
"extremely burdensome to households [and a requirement that] consumes an unreasonable
amount of State agencies' time" and fiscal budget. FRAC Childhood Hunger Testimony, supra
note 64, at 8. See generally Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 330-31 (questioning the need
for intense verification methods with regard to the Food Stamp Program).
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ceive benefits, administrators use the MRRB system to determine whether a
household continues to meet eligibility requirements.1 20 Policy analysts
have concluded that MRRB is ineffective in reducing program costs or error
rates.' 2 ' In fact, when first implemented in Illinois, benefit costs and error
rates sharply increased. 122 Surveys show that monthly reporting increases
termination rates but does not necessarily result in program cost savings. 1
23
Households having to comply with MRRB are sometimes cut from the Food
Stamp Program for purely technical violations caused by the length and
complexity of many states' monthly reporting forms.124 Bureaucratic disen-
titlement is exemplified when administrators terminate a household's bene-
fits despite the fact that its needs and eligibility remain unchanged.
Another provision that purports to improve the integrity of the Food
Stamp Program is the federal government's error rate sanction system. 125
This system imposes monetary penalties on states that frequently overissue
benefits or mistakenly characterize an ineligible household as eligible.' 26
Before enactment of the Hunger Prevention Act of 1988,127 many state offi-
cials and welfare analysts vehemently maintained that sanctioning did not
promote efficiency and instead forced Program officials to resort to "verifica-
tion extremism" in an attempt to avoid monetary penalties and meet feder-
120. REVIEW OF MONTHLY REPORTING, supra note 118, at ix. Households required to
comply with MRRB must, on a monthly basis, provide state welfare departments with infor-
mation regarding income, assets and household size, regardless of whether any changes have
occurred. Id. at 1. Today, the purpose of MRRB is to reduce program costs by accelerating
the transfer of information from the food stamp recipient to the food stamp office, thereby
enabling program administrators to identify non-eligible participants and instances of over-
issuance more efficiently. Id.
121. See id. at 16-18. Analysts state that results of demonstration projects show that
"[m]onthly reporting fail[s] to produce statistically significant savings" and that "retrospective
budgeting produce[s] no appreciable reduction in benefit costs." Id.
122. Id. at 13. Illinois' MRRB system did not produce program savings even after the
state's computer problems were resolved. Id.
123. See id. at 31-34 (discussing the phenomenon of "churning," whereby an eligible food
stamp household must reapply to the program after being closed out as a result of technical
noncompliance with MRRB).
124. See id. at 33-35. The Center for Budget and Policies Priorities concluded in its 1989
report on MRRB that "monthly reporting adds to administrative costs .... can lead to termi-
nation of benefits for recipients who are otherwise eligible, and . . . results in a substantial
amount of case closures followed by case reopenings (or 'churning')." Id. at 35.
125. See CRS, FOOD STAMP PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 83, at 23.
126. See id.
127. Pub. L. No. 100-435, 102 Stat. 1645 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C.) The process of fiscal sanctioning for food stamp issuance errors was restructured
and made less stringent by the Payment Accuracy Improvement System provisions of the 1988
Act. Id.
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ally mandated target rates. 2 ' To keep ineligibles out of the Program, states
require food stamp applicants to complete lengthy and complex forms.
129
This complicated application process prevents some eligible households from
participating in the Food Stamp Program. While provisions of the 1988 Act
reduced federal sanctioning, zealous federal quality control programs con-
tinue to overburden the states. Monetary penalties prompt states to invoke
administrative practices that prevent participation and have not proven to
substantially increase program integrity. 13 While state food stamp officials
berate Congress for imposing numerous complex and rigorous regula-
tions,' many of the practices and procedures implemented by state and
local offices are also quite complicated and discourage or prevent eligible
households from participating in the Food Stamp Program. 132 These ad-
ministrative policies conflict with the intent of the Food Stamp Act, yet Con-
128. See Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 330; BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 110-12.
See generally HISTORY, supra note 2, at 279 (explaining calculation methods used to determine
penalty amounts).
129. See FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 9 (describing applying for the Food Stamp
Program as, in some cases, an "arduous and time-consuming process"). Policy analysts have
advocated simplifying the Program's income eligibility limits and deduction system for over 15
years with little success. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RE-
SEARCH, FOOD STAMP REFORM 19 (May 24, 1977). Application forms have no page limits
and, in some states, exceed forty pages. FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 9. Some food stamp
applications require sixty pieces of information be provided regarding the household's compo-
sition, income, assets, and expenses. GAO, Administrative Hindrances, supra note 119, at 9.
Although the applicant is primarily responsible for obtaining the required documentation, fed-
eral regulation requires caseworkers to assist. Id. at 23. GAO has identified failure by food
stamp caseworkers to identify required documentation properly or assist applicants in the
compilation of documentary proof as a significant barrier to participation. Id. at 22-24.
130. See Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 329-31. It has been observed that "not
every program should have the same degree of administrative effort dedicated to fiscal integrity
and quality control because programs differ in the stakes involved and in the likelihood of
transgressions, and because the tighter controls, the greater the deterrence to participation."
Id. at 330-31.
131. See, e.g., BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 112-114 (declaring that some state program
adminisrators believe that the federal bureaucracy is used to "harass the states" and thereby
"kill the program"); SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, supra note 5, at 97 (describing pressure the federal
government exerts on states to decrease food stamp disbursements).
132. See GAO, Administrative Hindrances, supra note 119, passim. GAO reported the
existence of the following administrative hindrances: abbreviated office hours and unnecessary
screening interviews which limit access to food stamp applications and interviews, id. at 14-17;
failure to encourage applicants to file promptly, id. at 17-18; lack of assistance in assembling
required verification documents, id. at 22-25; premature denial of applications, id. at 21-22;
improper terminations caused by administrative error or based on unverified allegations, id. at
26-29; and untimely or improper response to expedited benefit requests, a practice which is
particularly evident among homeless applicants. Id. at 19-21. See also SCHWARTZ-NOBEL,
supra note 5, at 92-96 (providing testimonial evidence of non-compliance with federal food
stamp regulations and the hostility and prejudice of some welfare department employees).
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gress has not revised them.' 3 3 Efforts undertaken by community
organizations, such as on-site and telephone monitoring, have provided con-
siderable data, but the data have not been utilized by local social service
offices to improve the system.
1 3 4
Federal and state legislators and program administrators continue to re-
vise the program by implementing new regulations or modifying existing
ones.' 35 As a result, bureaucratic disentitlements promise to continue to
plague the Food Stamp Program.' 36  In fact, the impending proposed
amendment involving child support sanctioning 137 demonstrates that Con-
133. GAO recommended that the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) Administrator
"[i]dentify administrative hindrances to food stamp participation ... focusing on hindrances
identified in [GAO's 1988] report, and assist states in overcoming these hindrances by sharing
this information with all states." Id. at 41.
134. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition Against Hunger, "Standing in the Welfare Lines . .
The Alabama Food Stamp Program (March, 1989) (available from ACAH, Auburn, AL); John
Colgan et al., Illinois Hunger Coalition, Hunger in Illinois: The Work and Struggle for Food
Security (June 1990) (available from IHC, Springfield, IL); D.C. Hunger Action, The D.C.
Food Stamp System, supra note 112; D.C. Hunger Action, Monitoring of D.C. Food Stamp
Offices - a Tabulation (June 1991) (available from D.C. Hunger Action, Washington, D.C.);
Shirley Powell & Richard A. Jones, Southeastern Michigan Food Coalition, Food Stamp Moni-
toring Project (May, 1987) (detailing a study of the operation of the Food Stamp Program in
Wayne County, Michigan) (available from SMFC, Detroit, MI). Recommendations include:
conducting additional and more thorough training of all employees who communicate food
stamp information; providing food stamp office staff with informational and psychological sup-
port; developing or re-implementing outreach programs; and responding more quickly to ur-
gent requests (e.g., petitions from displaced persons, individuals with medical problems or
disabilities).
135. See Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 5, at 330 n.27 (citing the statistic that, during a
thirty month period, ninety "major regulatory changes" affecting the Food Stamp Program
were promulgated by the Food and Nutrition Service).
136. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (describing state procedures to police
enrollment and participation).
137. See infra note 218 and accompanying text. Testifying before the House Subcommittee
on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and Nutrition, John M. Bouman, an attorney
with the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, ardently spoke against the proposal to ex-
pand child support enforcement procedures to the Food Stamp Program. Mr. Bouman stated
that "sanctioning focuses the agressiveness [sic] of the state agency on the recipient rather than
on the absent parent and often results in unnecessary humiliation of recipients; ... sanctioning
has had no beneficial relationship at all to the rate of actual child support collections." Formu-
lation of the 1990 Farm Bill, Part 3 (Food Stamp and Commodity Distribution Programs):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and Nutrition of
the House Comm. on Agric., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1187-88, 1197 (Feb. 28, 1990) (testimony of
John M. Bouman). The latter is due, in part, to the fact that child support enforcement pro-
grams are presently overwhelmed. Relying on stipulated facts in Doston v. Duffy, 732 F.
Supp. 857 (N.D. I11. 1988), a class action suit alleging wrongful reduction of AFDC benefits,
Bouman described the following as "inherent problems with implementing sanctioning sys-
tems" in the Food Stamp Program. Id. at 1193. First, social service workers who hold nega-
tive biases toward members of lower socio-economic classes may treat applicants and
recipients unfairly. Second, the cost of locating absentee parents who are financially unable to
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gress is far from recognizing that such policies do not increase efficiency.
The child support sanctioning amendment would require states to transfer
resources that could be used to increase staff sizes or improve training to-
wards activities that discourage or prevent participation.1
38
2. From Fair Hearings to Lawsuits: Often Inadequate or Inefficient
Remedies
When seeking to resolve a dispute with the food stamp office, applicants
and recipients must request a fair hearing.' 39 Regulations promulgated by
USDA provide that an impartial hearing official must conduct fair hearings
within forty-five to sixty days of receipt of the request,"4 and the hearing
process should be designed so that "the household feel[s] ... at ease." 14'
support their children exceeds any benefit the child might ultimately receive. Id. at 1196-98.
Mr. Bouman concluded by stating that "[a]dding a food stamps sanction for non-cooperation
with child support enforcement will inevitably lead to fewer eligible people applying for food
stamps. And it will.., keep some recipients away from the program who could benefit from
it, while... burden[ing] the already overburdened [child support enforcement program]." Id.
at 1199.
138. The tactics the federal government employs to compel states to decrease the national
welfare caseload paradoxically inflates the already serious budgetary strain states are exper-
iencing. As budget problems multiply, states are less able to operate effective assistance pro-
grams. See generally UNITED STATES CONFERENCE ON MAYORS, supra note 68, at 20-23
(reporting the level of unmet need for food assistance in surveyed cities). For example, states
that fail by 1995 to have 20% of their welfare recipients enrolled in an employment and train-
ing program will lose federal funding. In some cases federal dollars comprise 50% of the
program's budget. Welfare Paradox, WASH. POST, July 29, 1991, at AI0.
139. 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(a) (1991). FRAC advises persons to request a fair hearing ifa case
worker is unable or unwilling to solve a problem concerning food stamp benefits. FRAC'S
GUIDE, supra note 42, at 45. Citing case law and a 1979 USDA policy memorandum, FRAC
states that "[h]ouseholds have the right to a hearing on anything the food stamp office does
that has a significant effect on its application for or receipt of benefits or other services the
office provides." Id. at 45 n.133; see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(a).
140. The hearing official is defined as one who "[d]oes not have any personal stake or
involvement in the case; was not directly involved in the initial determination of the action
which is being contested; and was not the immediate supervisor of the eligibility worker who
took the action." 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(m) (1991). State level hearings are to be held within sixty
days of receipt of a fair hearing request while local level hearings are to be conducted within
forty-five days. Id. at § 273.15(c)(1),(2).
141. Id. at § 273.15(p) (1991). A request for a fair hearing can be oral or written by a
representative or member of the household. Id. at § 274.15(h). The request must be made
within 90 days of the alleged wrongful action unless the dispute relates to an on-going policy
and the household is presently certified. Id. at § 273.15(g). Section 273.15(p) provides, in
part, that households have the right to:
(1) Examine all documents and records to be used at the hearing ....
(2) Present the case or have it presented by a legal counsel or other person.
(3) Bring witnesses.
(4) Advance arguments without undue interference.
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In theory, the fair hearing process provides households with an effective
means of resolving conflicts over food stamp benefits and services. 142 As
implemented, however, the process is unsatisfactory. For example, state
welfare offices habitually fail to process applications and issue benefits in a
timely manner. 143 Haskins v. Stanton44 involved a claim brought by indi-
gent persons against state and county Food Stamp Program administrators
for failure to process their applications within the legal deadline. Haskins
presented the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit with
the issue of whether the administrative remedies (i.e. fair hearings) provided
by the Act were the sole conduit for relief or whether complainants had a
private right of action. The court held for the plaintiffs, finding that "admin-
istrative hearings do nothing to redress violations of the [Food Stamp] Act
that prevent applicants from obtaining a timely decision on their initial food
stamp application."' 145 The court's finding points to the inadequacy of the
administrative hearing process. Persons who are eligible but wrongly pre-
cluded from participating in the Food Stamp Program are unlikely to be
informed about their rights under the Food Stamp Act.'4 6 Such individuals
are also apt to lack the resources needed to acquire the necessary informa-
tion and assistance.
Furthermore, while a fair hearing in some instances resolves an individ-
ual's claim, the process does not correct state or local administrative prac-
tices that conflict with federal requirements. 47 Applicants and recipients
(5) Question or refute any testimony or evidence, including an opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
(6) Submit evidence to establish all pertinent facts and circumstances in the case.
142. See id. at § 273.15; FRAC's GUIDE, supra note 42, at 45; Madrid v. McMahon, 183
Cal. App. 3d 151, 228 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1986).
143. Investigations show that food stamp case workers frequently do not process applica-
tions in a timely manner, use incorrect eligibility standards, and neglect to screen applicants to
determine whether they qualify for expedited service. See Neumeyer, supra note 54, at 1271.
Parties provided the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
Harley v. Lyng, 653 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1986), with over 400 undisputed illustrations of
violative action on the part of the state or USDA. Id.; see also Alabama Coalition Against
Hunger, supra note 134, at 12-24; Colgan et al., supra note 134, 49-50, 81 (recounting the
testimony of persons eligible for food stamps and employees of charitable organizations who
experienced or documented gross errors and violations in the delivery of food stamps); D.C.
Hunger Action, supra note 134, passim (providing statistical and testimonial evidence of ac-
tions carried out by food stamp office staff that violate federal law).
144. 794 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1986).
145. Id. at 1276.
146. See id.
147. See Leonard Weiser-Varon, Note, Injunctive Relief From State Violations of Federal
Funding Conditions, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1243 (1982). Fair hearings have the limited
purpose of determining whether the eligibility status of an individual has been properly evalu-
ated, not to correct state policies and laws that conflict with federal regulations.
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must therefore rely on the federal government to police the administration of
the program at the local level. Unfortunately, individual beneficiaries are
excluded from this procedure. 48  Consequently, an increasing number of
food stamp disputes are now brought in federal court. 49
Several lower courts have addressed claims brought by participants who
fail to receive food stamp benefits in a timely manner.' 5 ° These cases indi-
cate that judicial remedies under the present law are often inadequate or in
some instances unavailable. '' The issue of federal jurisdiction is one imped-
iment to judicial relief. While federal courts have exercised jurisdiction over
disputes involving food stamp benefits when prospective injunctive relief is
sought, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether
the Eleventh Amendment provides a state with immunity from food stamp
litigation.'52 Proponents arguing against state immunity contend that, be-
cause food stamp benefits are completely funded by the federal government
148. See id. at 1242-43. The Secretary of Agriculture is required by statute to discontinue
federal funding of a state's food stamp program if the state continues to violate federal pro-
gram conditions after receiving notice of its non-compliance and an opportunity to respond. 7
U.S.C. § 2020(g) (1988). Federal administrative agencies, however, rarely terminate federal
funding of noncomplying state programs. Weiser-Varon, supra note 147, at 1242-43. And,
while the agency may decline to use its prosecutorial authority for altruistic reasons (i.e., a
greater number of beneficiaries would suffer from this action), the result is that federal agencies
are largely impotent with respect to policing state compliance with the Food Stamp Act. See
id.
149. Weiser-Varon, supra note 147, at 1243. See generally FRAC's GUIDE, supra note 42,
at i n. 1 (introducing the many cases the Guide cites that present disputes involving food stamp
issues).
150. See, e.g., Lidie v. California, 478 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that plaintiffs'
claims involving the 30 day rule were deflated by the subsequent passage of new regulations
and that plaintiffs could be denied restitution if the delay was determined to be justified); Hess
v. Hughes, 500 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Md. 1980) (characterizing the state's application process as
in conflict with the spirit of the Food Stamp Act's regulations and acknowledging that the
parties' consent decree merely required defendant to comply with federal law).
Federal law requires that newly certified households be provided with coupons or authoriza-
tion documents within 30 calendar days from the date their application is filed. 7 C.F.R.
§ 274.2 (b)(1) (1991). Generally, households that qualify for expedited service are to receive
coupons or authorization documents within 5 calendar days. See id. at § 273.2 (i). During the
last decade, the judiciary has not been particularly receptive to the predicaments of low-in-
come households. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985). In Atkins, the Court casually
acknowledged that eligible applicants often fail to receive statutory entitlements due to "inad-
vertent errors ... that can occur in the administration of any large welfare program." Id. at
127.
151. See infra, notes 152-69 and accompanying text.
152. See Paschal v. Didrickson, No. 91-577, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 626, at *1 (Jan. 27, 1992)
(White, J. dissenting); see also Valerie McWilliams, Retroactive Relief in Food Stamp Litiga-
tion: Why the Eleventh Amendment Is Not a Bar, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 113, 114 (1988)
(proposing three arguments advocates should make to counter a state's claim of Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
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and states are required to pay only a portion of the program's administra-
tive costs, 153 a state's treasury is not impacted to a degree significant enough
to trigger the Eleventh Amendment.15 4 However, the stringent language
used by the Supreme Court in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 155 sug-
gests that food stamp litigants seeking retroactive relief may well be stymied
by a state's successful invocation of Eleventh Amendment immunity.'5 6
Food stamp litigants who rely on constitutional claims also must wage a
difficult battle. 5 7 The position of strength that the Supreme Court, in At-
153. See OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1387; McWilliams, supra note 152, at 114. States
that meet federal target error rate levels are only required to pay 40% of the Program's admin-
istrative costs; states that exceed the target rate may have to pay 60% of the administrative
costs. Id. at 114 n. 16.
154. See McWilliams, supra note 152, at 115-116; see, e.g., Foggs v. Block, 722 F.2d 933
(1st Cir. 1983) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal courts from order-
ing the restoration of federally funded food stamp benefits), rev'd on other grounds, Atkins v.
Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985). In Foggs, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
stated "[s]ince the cost of the food stamp program is borne by the federal government, we see
no Eleventh Amendment bar to the restoration of benefits. The state may incur some adminis-
trative costs, if it has to restore benefits, but these should be de minimis." Id. at 941 n. 6.
155. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
156. Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), involved a discrimination suit for retroactive mone-
tary relief under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). The Court in Atas-
cadero held that once the Eleventh Amendment immunity attaches, waiver of this immunity
can only be accomplished by an "unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to federal-court
jurisdiction." Id. at 241 (emphasis added). The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that
by participating and receiving federal funds under a federal statute that contains provisions
aimed at the state, a state necessarily consents to suit in federal court. Id. at 246-47; cf Cotton
v. Mansour, 863 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 835 (1990) (ruling that
plaintiff's claim for retroactive benefits was barred by the Eleventh Amendment). The court in
Cotton explained that:
[t]he purpose of the food stamp program is to enable families to obtain a nutritionally
adequate diet. As a practical matter, that goal may not be fulfilled retroactively.
Therefore an award of relief for past errors would be compensatory rather than reme-
dial in nature. Policy considerations strongly suggest that the distribution of limited
resources to those presently in need of food stamp assistance better serves the pur-
poses of the Act than an award to persons whose circumstances may have been im-
proved in this interim period.
Id. at 1247; cf Colbeth v. O'Rourke, 707 F.2d 57 (2d. Cir. 1983) (affirming district court's
conclusion that a suit for retroactive payment of food stamp benefits was barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment). But see McWilliams, supra note 152, at 118 (asserting that because the
Food Stamp Act requires the restoration of wrongfully withheld benefits, Congress has ex-
pressly abrogated a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity).
157. See, e.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1984) (holding that plaintiffs, who received
only general notice of a mass change involving food stamp eligibility and benefit levels, were
provided with adequate due process given the availability of a fair hearing); West v. Bowen,
879 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir. 1989) (ruling that a food stamp recipient's due process rights were not
violated regardless of the length of time taken to determine applicant's eligibility to receive
disability benefits); Biggs v. Lyng, 823 F.2d 15 (2d.Cir. 1987) (holding that the Secretary of
Agriculture's definitions were reasonable and therefore not violative of plaintiff's equal protec-
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kins v. Parker,158 appears to place such individuals in is deceptive. In At-
kins, food stamp recipients attacked the adequacy of the notice informing
them that their benefits may be reduced or terminated.' 5 9 The Court began
its analysis by affirmatively recognizing that eligible food stamp applicants
possess a constitutionally protected property interest, declaring that "[flood
stamp benefits, like the welfare benefits at issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, 'are a
matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.' Such
entitlements are appropriately treated as a form of 'property' protected by
the Due Process Clause. ' '16
The Court's ruling in Atkins, however, attaches a lethal qualifier to this
declaration of rights. The Court reversed the court of appeals' decision,
finding that the mass notifications were lawful under the Due Process
Clause.' 61 In so doing, the majority dismissed food stamp deprivations
caused by erroneous calculations performed by the food stamp office, which
resulted from a change in the law.' 62 It also ruled that individual notifica-
tion regarding benefit changes would impinge on the power of Congress to
change public benefit laws.163  Based on Atkins, the property interest pos-
sessed by food stamp recipients is highly transitory, subject to the impulses
of the federal legislature and state administrators.'" 4 Justice Brennan, dis-
senting in Atkins, asserted that the repercussion of the majority's analysis is
tion rights); Holman v. Block, 823 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1987) (ruling that Congress intended food
stamp recipients to possess only a limited property interest in the household's benefits); Banks
v. Block, 700 F.2d. 292 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding that recertifying food stamp recipients possess
no property interest in food stamp benefits once the certification period has expired), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 934 (1983); Moore v. Perales, 692 F. Supp. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding
that state and local government agencies were only required to substantially comply with the
Food Stamp Act).
158. 472 U.S. 115 (1985).
159. See id. at 120-23. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had af-
firmed the district court's holding that the notice was constitutionally deficit. Foggs v. Block,
722 F.2d 933, 939-40 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985). Notice was
ruled inadequate by the lower courts because food stamp recipients were not informed how the
regulation change would effect their benefits or how recipients could determine the accuracy of
the food stamp office's calculations. In short, the lower courts found that recipients were not
provided with the information they needed in order to decide whether to request a fair hearing.
See id. at 939.
160. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 128 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 129-31.
162. See id. at 128.
163. Id. at 129.
164. See id. at 129-31. In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the majority incorrectly
characterized plaintiff's claim as one against Congress, when in fact plaintiffs alleged that it
was the state agency's application of the changed law that violated their right to due process.
See id. at 153 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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for the Constitution to provide public assistance recipients with no protec-
tion from administrative errors, which deny valid property interests.
1 65
The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Banks v. Block also illustrates the limitations
of a food stamp litigant's constitutional argument. In Banks, food stamp
recipients, whose certification period had ended, argued that dismissal from
the program before a fair hearing was conducted on the issue of whether
they were eligible for recertification, deprived them of due process.1 66 The
court rejected plaintiffs' argument, reasoning that a food stamp recipient's
property interest in receiving benefits is circumscribed by the length of the
specific certification period. 167 This holding limits the ability of food stamp
recipients who have been wrongly denied recertification to argue their case
based on a denial of adequate due process.
Distinguishing a recipient's statutory right to food stamp benefits from the
property interest held by the plaintiffs in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Banks court
analogized a food stamp beneficiary's property interest with the unsuccessful
claim brought by the plaintiff in Board of Regents v. Roth. 168 The analogy is
disturbing as is the court's conclusion that a household undergoing recertifi-
cation has an "interest no greater than that of an initial applicant."' 6 9 This
conclusion disregards the fact that food stamp benefits are a source of secur-
165. See id. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote that unless protection
against administrative errors is afforded, "the development of... [the] Court's "new property"
jurisprudence over the past 15 years represents a somewhat hollow victory." Id.
166. Banks v. Block, 700 F.2d 292, 293 (6th Cir. 1982).
167. Id. The court held that "a household has no protectable property interest in the con-
tinuous entitlement to food stamps beyond the expiration of ... [this] period." Id. at 297.
The Banks court differentiated food stamp benefits from "continuous" cash welfare pay-
ments, such as those disputed in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Id. at 297-98. The
court's reasoning appears sound as it relied on the House Agriculture Committee's statement
concerning certification periods and the Food Stamp Program. Id. at 297. The Committee's
report stated: "[tihis reinforces the limited nature of the property interest conferred by certifi-
cation - an entitlement for one certification period and one certification period only." Id.
(citing H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 282, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1704,
2219).
168. 408 U.S. 564 (1972); see Banks, 700 F.2d at 296-97 (comparing the Banks plaintiffs
with the plaintiff in Roth). The Supreme Court in Roth held that a state university was not
required to afford an untenured assistant professor a hearing prior to its decision not to renew
his contract. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that "[t]o
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it." Id. at 577 (emphasis added). Food stamp benefits, dispersed in coupon form,
resemble currency but may not be freely utilized to fulfill an "abstract need or desire." See 7
U.S.C. § 2012(g) (1988); 7 C.F.R. § 271.2 (1991). With few exceptions (such as seeds and
plants used to grow food), food stamps may only be used to buy food. The category of eligible
items does not include soap, toothpaste, pet food, or prepared foods sold in a grocery store.
See id.; FRAC GUIDE, supra note 42, at 13.
169. See Banks, 700 F.2d at 298.
[Vol. 41:421
Reformation of the Food Stamp Act
ity and not luxuries or gratuities. 7 ' Instead, recertifying households should
be viewed in a manner similar to the plaintiffs in Goldberg: the court must
consider the importance of the benefit to the individual."' Low-income
households receiving food stamps have "brutal need" for those benefits.
17 2
Such persons are not comparable to the plaintiff in Roth, whom the Court
described as "having an abstract concern in being rehired" but remained free
to seek another job. 173  Food stamp benefits often constitute a recipient
household's entire food budget or a significant portion thereof. The benefits
are a source of sustenance rather than a nonessential.
74
170. See id. at 297; Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255-56 (1965); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264; Atkins, 472 U.S.
at 150 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Dissenting in Atkins, Justice Brennan stated: "[t]he impor-
tance of the correct level of food stamp benefits to eligible households cannot be overstated...
the [Flood [S]tamp [P]rogram by definition provides benefits only to those persons who are
unable to afford even a minimally adequate diet on their own." Id.
The Food Stamp Act recognizes and accommodates a household's expectation to continue
to receive food stamp benefits if their financial situation has not changed during the certifica-
tion period. The Act states that "[i]f a household reapplies for benefits before the fifteenth day
of the last month of its certification period, an eligibility determination must be made in suffi-
cient time so that, if found eligible, there will be no interruption in benefits between the old and
new certification periods." 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(4) (1988).
171. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-64. The Court stated that "[t]he extent to which proce-
dural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' and depends on whether the recipient's interest in avoiding
that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." Id. at 262-63 (quot-
ing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)).
172. See id. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
The Court recognized that welfare recipients are uniquely desperate because of their lack of
independent resources.
173. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972). As the Court in Goldberg acknowledged, welfare
entitlements are "sources of security ... [and] . . .are no longer regarded as luxuries or
gratuities [but rather] essentials ... in no sense a form of charity." Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262
n.8 (citing Reich, supra note 170, at 1255).
A lapse in a household's certification for food stamps sometimes occurs because the food
stamp office fails to provide the household with proper notification that recertification is due.
In light of this fact, the language in Goldberg appears applicable to the predicament of food
stamp recipients, though their entitlement is statutorily limited. The Court in Goldberg be-
lieved it relevant "that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility
may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits .... His
need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his
ability to seek redress from welfare bureaucracy." Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (citing Comment,
Due Process and the Right to A Prior Hearing in Welfare Cases, 37 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 604,
610-11 (1969)).
174. See generally FRAC's FACTS, supra note 62, at 20 (discussing the positive effect food
stamp benefits have on a household's economic status). The indispensable nature of food
stamp benefits is supported by the fact that the food-related needs of a household are often not
fulfilled through its participation in the Food Stamp Program. See Colgan et. al., supra note
134, at 80. USDA studies reveal that low-income households do not necessarily have cash
income to purchase food. Id. The gap between economic resources and required expenditures
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Provisions of the Food Stamp Act or state policies that operate as "bu-
reaucratic disentitlements"' 175 may, however, be vulnerable to a challenge
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 176 The anticipated child support sanc-
tioning amendment 177 is susceptible to such an attack. Such a challenge has
two foundations: child support sanctioning, a system that requires a custo-
dial parent to cooperate with the Child Support Enforcement Agency to be
eligible for welfare benefits, arguably presents either a denial of equal protec-
tion or deprivation of a liberty interest without due process. 171 In framing
an equal protection argument, the first query is whether a parent applying
for or receiving food stamps, whose former partner is delinquent with re-
spect to child support, is a member of a "suspect class." If an eligible custo-
dial parent belongs to a suspect class, the proposed sanctioning amendment
receives strict judicial scrutiny. 179 While "poverty, standing alone, is not a
suspect classification,"180 single parents and their children who receive food
stamps are perhaps a more "discrete and insular minorit[y]" 'I 1 than the
poor at large. Persons eligible to receive food stamps are particularly desper-
ate. Not only do they have few assets and minimal income,' 82 but they are
likely to suffer from under-nutrition, a mentally and physically weakening
is largely due to high shelter costs, which for a poor household can comprise over half of its
monthly gross income. See CCHIP SUMMARY, supra note 61, at "Relationships between In-
come, Shelter Costs, Employment and Hunger."
175. See supra note 115-17 and accompanying text.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment, based on its language,
does not apply to the federal government; however, an array of cases have held that equal
protection claims against the federal government are considered under the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause prohibition against unjustifiable discrimination in the same manner as
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenges against a state. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
177. See infra note 218 and accompanying text (describing an anticipated child support
sanctioning amendment that would require custodial parents to prove they have cooperated
with the Child Support Enforcement Agency in order to be eligible for food stamps).
178. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-14, at 265 (1978).
179. See id. § 16-6, at 1000, § 16-13, at 1012, § 11-4, at 573. Legislation that impinges on
an individual's fundamental rights or "suggest[s] prejudice against racial or other minorities"
must receive a stiffer level of judicial review than mere rationality. Id. § 16-6, at 1000. Profes-
sor Tribe points out that legislation which impairs fundamental rights rarely survives strict
scrutiny. Id.
180. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). But see Frank I. Michelman, On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 21 (1969) (asserting that the
classification of being poor is a "badge of inferiority" equatable to being cataloged as a racial
minority).
181. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938). Justice Stone's
statement regarding prejudice against discrete and insular minorities is often cited to justify
judicial review of legislation involving individual rights. See TRIBE, supra note 178, § 8-7, at
581-82. The clause describes persons who lack political power and therefore cannot exert their
will through the legislative process. Id. § 16-6, at 1453-54.
182. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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condition. 83 Arguably, the proposed child support sanctioning amendment
fails even the "traditional approach"' 4 because it is a grossly inadequate
measure for achieving the government's purpose of wanting to compel eco-
nomically capable persons to pay legally mandated child support. 85
A second method of attacking the constitutionality of a child support
sanctioning amendment involves an individual's rights to privacy or liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment. A line of Supreme Court decisions sup-
ports the assertion that requiring a custodial parent to take affirmative action
to track down a defaulting absentee parent in order to receive food stamp
benefits violates that parent's right to privacy'8 6 or liberty interests. 8 7 For
example, in Meyer v. Nebraska,"" the Court declared that "[w]ithout doubt,
[the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty interests] denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
... establish a home and bring up children." 8 9 This decision and others
confirm the high regard with which the Court views family autonomy. 190
While the family is not beyond regulation, a law that compels former
spouses and estranged couples to communicate with one another appears an
invalid intrusion. Encroachment on the rights of a custodial parent is partic-
ularly vexing considering the potential risk of psychological or physical
harm and the minimal effectiveness of child support sanctioning laws.' 9'
183. See GROWING EPIDEMIC, supra note 5, at 98, 119. Poor nutrition can cause mental
lethargy, weakness and can impair an individual's immune system.
184. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976). The Court in Dukes held that
an ordinance that serves a legitimate purpose must only meet the less stringent rationality
requirement, such that the ordinance has a strong presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 303.
185. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. This argument is also applicable to cur-
rent provisions of the Food Stamp Act that function as bureaucratic disentitlements. See supra
notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
186. The Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), stated that
while the right to privacy is not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, the Bill of Rights
"has penumbras" that give "life and substance" to the specific guarantees; one such ramifica-
tion of this is the creation of a "zone of privacy." Id. at 484.
187. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (illustrating the Supreme
Court's definition of "liberty interests" that afford individuals procedural protection).
188. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
189. Id. at 399.
190. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a city ordinance
that prevented a grandmother from having her two grandchildren live with her); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing an individual's right to privacy in matters concerning procre-
ation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (limiting the government's ability
to infiltrate the family by declaring that a child is not a "mere creature of the State"); see also
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986). The Court in Castillo held that strict scrutiny must be
applied to legislation that "directly and substantially interfere[s] with a family living arrange-
ments and thereby burden[s] a fundamental right." Id. at 638 (citation omitted).
191. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. Affirming the special protection that the family unit is to
be afforded, the Supreme Court in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990), ruled that
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Revising the Food Stamp Program through litigation presents a difficult
task due to courts' resistance to fully recognize the constitutional rights of
food stamp recipients. 192 Even more fundamental, however, is the unfortu-
nate fact that eligible households, because of their fear of government retalia-
tion, are often unwilling to pursue their claim.'
93
III. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING THE FOOD STAMP ACT
A. Express and Anticipated Provisions of the Mickey Leland Childhood
Hunger Relief Act
On February 28, 1991, members of the 102d Congress introduced the
Mickey Leland Childhood Hunger Relief Act' 94 (hereinafter "Leland bill"),
a bill to amend the Food Stamp Act of 1977.195 The Committee on Agricul-
"It]he State has no legitimate interest in conforming family life to a state-designed ideal by
requiring family members to talk together." Id. at 2946. Hodgson involved the question of
whether a Minnesota law requiring two-parent notification by a minor wishing to undergo an
abortion violated the Constitution. The Court found that such forced communication is, in
some instances, detrimental to rather than protective of the integrity of the family. Id. at 2945,
2955.
192. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that the potential
hardships incurred by recipients of social security benefits did not warrant a pre-termination
hearing); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1437-
39 (1989) (asserting that the Supreme Court rejects constitutional challenges by finding that
the regulation or policy only has a deterrent effect and is not a coercive penalty).
193. Interviews with food stamp recipients, Washington, D.C. (July-August 1991).
194. H.R. 1202, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill was introduced by House Budget
Committee Chairman Leon E. Panetta (D-CA), Rep. Bill Emerson (R-MO), House Agricul-
ture Committee Chairman Kika de la Garza (D-TX), and Rep. Robin Tallon (D-SC), Chair-
man of the Agriculture Committee's Nutrition Subcommittee. Chairman of the Senate
Agriculture Committee Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee
Jim Sasser (D-TN) introduced the companion bill, S. 757, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), in the
Senate on March 21, 1991.
195. The bills' synopses state that the goals of the bills are:
to amend the Food Stamp Act of 1977 to respond to the hunger emergency afflicting
American families and children, to attack the causes of hunger among all Americans,
to ensure an adequate diet for low-income people who are homeless or at risk of
homelessness because of the shortage of affordable housing, to promote self-suffi-
ciency among food stamp recipients, to assist families affected by adverse economic
conditions, to simplify food assistance programs' administration, and for other
purposes.
H.R. 1202, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 757, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Title I's provisions include: eventual removal of the cap on shelter cost deductions claimed
by families with children; increasing food stamp benefits by reformulating the estimated in-
creased cost of the Thrifty Food Plan; prohibiting benefit pro-rating with regard to recipients
whose eligibility is briefly suspended during the recertification process; exclusion of third-party
housing payments made to homeless individuals residing in transitional housing; increasing
funding for the Nutrition Assistance Program in Puerto Rico; and allowing individuals receiv-
ing general assistance payments for items other than rent or mortgage to exclude such pay-
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ture amended the bill and, on October 16, 1991, recommended it for pas-
sage. 196  Ostensibly, the bill would decrease the incidence of domestic
hunger, particularly among children, by making the Food Stamp Program a
more effective and efficient vehicle for providing low-income households
with food assistance. 197 The major provisions of the Leland bill, as
amended, include: adjustments to benefit levels and deduction amounts in
order to ensure adequate assistance; the promotion of self-sufficiency by
granting additional or larger deductions and improving employment and
ments from their income calculations. Id. §§ 101-06; see also Memorandum from Joe
Richardson, Specialist in Social Legislation, Education and Public Welfare Division, Congres-
sional Research Service [hereinafter CRS Leland Bill Memorandum] (July 17, 1991) (on file
with author); "Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1202 and S. 757: The Mickey Leland
Childhood Hunger Relief Act of 1991" [hereinafter Leland Analysis] (March 29, 1991) (avail-
able from FRAC, Washington, D.C.).
Title II, Promoting Self-Sufficiency, provides that parents receiving child support payments
are permitted to exclude the first $50 from their monthly income estimates; permits absent
parents who pay child support to deduct the payments when calculating their income for food
stamp eligibility and benefit level; indexes the current limit on the fair market value of vehicles
owned by food stamp recipients and grants an exemption for vehicles needed to transport
water or fuel; raises the amount of reimbursements paid to food stamp recipients participating
in employment and training (E&T) program for dependant child care costs and other work-
related costs. H.R. 1202 §§ 201-205(c), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 757 §§ 201-205(c),
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Title III, Simplifying the Provision of Food Assistance, alters the definition of a "house-
hold" for food stamp eligibility by basing the meaning almost solely on whether food is
purchased and prepared jointly or separately, and raises the resource limit for households that
include a disabled person to $3,000, the limit assigned to households with one or more elderly
persons. Section 303, entitled "Assuring Adequate Funding for the Food Stamp Program",
permanently authorizes the Food Stamp Program, eliminating funding caps and reduction
procedures that could require benefits to cease if program funding was insufficient. H.R. 1202
§§ 301-303, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 757 §§ 301-303, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see
also CRS Leland Bill Memorandum, supra, at 5; Leland Analysis, supra, at 6-7.
196. H.R. REP. No. 396, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The amendments made by the
Agricultural Committee include: a technical change involving the addition of a subsection to
section 101 entitled "(c) Conforming Amendment"; an additional section under Title I enti-
tled "Helping Low-Income High School Students" (this change would allow the income of all
high school students, regardless of age, to be excluded from the calculation of eligibility and
benefit levels); and an additional title, "Commodity Distribution to Needy Families," which
authorizes increased spending for the purchase, processing, and distribution of agricultural
commodities. The final change instituted by the Agricultural Committee was the addition of
§ 502, which is entitled "Budget Neutrality Requirement." This section stipulates that none of
the provisions of the bill will go into effect unless the costs are fully offset through fiscal year
1996. The offset must come in the form of a tax increase or a reduction in program spending.
See id. § 502, at 5, 17. Section 502 fulfills the requirements of the Balanced Budget and Emer-
gency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which mandates that the Food Stamp Program operate on
a pay-as-you-go basis.
197. See H.R. 1202; S. 757; see also infra note 234 (outlining the estimate federal fiscal
outlays for the Leland bill for 1992-1996).
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training activities; the revision of definitions in order to simplify administra-
tion; and increasing federal funding of commodity distribution programs.' 98
1. Express Provisions
The essence of the Leland bill is to promote self-sufficiency and improve
nutrition among low-income families by providing higher levels of food
stamp benefits.19 9 Section 101 of the Leland bill removes the $186 shelter
cost cap imposed on non-elderly and disabled households. The shelter de-
duction cap, which was originally imposed to prevent high-income house-
holds from participating in the program, is now viewed as illegitimately
penalizing needy families with children.2" Section 102 increases food stamp
benefit levels. 20  This section requires the benefit level to be gradually raised
each year, until a level of 105% of the Thrifty Food Plan is reached.20 2
Current benefit levels have long been viewed as inadequate. 20 3 Under sec-
tion 104 of the bill, homeless individuals and families are permitted to ex-
clude vendor payments2°  for "transitional housing" (temporary housing
facilities).20 5 This provision makes the treatment of vendor payments for
transitional housing uniform throughout the states.20 6 Sections 201 and 202
involve the payment and receipt of child support payments.20 7 Together,
these two amendments act as incentives to encourage payors and payees to
obey child support laws.208 Section 205 raises the limits under employment
and training (E&T) programs for dependent-care deductions and work-re-
198. See H.R. Rep. No. 396, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. 7-12 (1991).
199. See id. at 6-7.
200. See id. at 7.
201. Id. at 3.
202. Id.; see also supra note 105 (regarding the methodology of the Thrifty Food Plan in
establishing benefit levels).
203. See supra note 105; see also Thrifty Food Plan Benefit Levels, 45 FED. REG. 22, 876
(1980) (stating that a diet based on the TFP provides only two-thirds of the Recommended
Daily Allowances).
204. Vendor payments are monies paid by a non-household member to a third party service
provider. See FRAC's GUIDE, supra note 42, at 6. Vendor payments currently counted as
income include, for example, money legally owed to a food stamp recipient that is being di-
verted to pay off a debt that person owes, and some types of welfare benefits, such as AFDC,
and General Assistance. 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(1)(iv) (1990); see FRAC's GUIDE, supra note 42,
at 73-74. Vendor payments rules were designed, in part, to prevent recipients of both AFDC
and food stamps from converting all their AFDC benefits into vendor payments and thereby
excluding them from income calculations. See Leland Analysis, supra note 195, at 3.
205. H.R. REP. No. 396, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1991).
206. See id. at 14.
207. Id. at 4, 15.
208. See Leland Analysis, supra note 195, at 4.
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lated costs.2 ° 9 Such provisions promote self-sufficiency by heightening the
likelihood that participants will become more active in the workforce.
210
Section 301 of the Leland bill purports to simplify the definition of
"household" for households with children and others.2 1 Under current
law, a household is generally defined as an individual or persons who live
together and habitually purchase food and prepare their meals together.21 2
Unless they qualify under one of the exceptions, spouses, parents, children
and siblings are considered to be in the same household, regardless of their
purchasing and food preparation customs.213 Section 301 modifies the defi-
nition of household to exclude relatives, regardless of age or disability, who
live together but buy and prepare their meals separately.214 Section 302
raises the resource limit claimable by households with at least one disabled
member 215 from $2,000 to $3,000.216 The provision endeavors to allow a
greater number of households that meet this profile to participate in the
Food Stamp Program.217
209. Id. at 6.
210. See generally CRS, FOOD STAMP PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 83, at 42-43
(describing the operation and purpose of food stamp employment and training programs).
211. See H.R. REP. No. 396, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 16 (1991). Eligibility and benefit
amounts are evaluated based on the size and characteristics of the "household" applying. See
7 C.F.R. § 273.1(g)(1) (1991). A single individual or unrelated persons may constitute a
"household" for food stamp purposes. Id. at § 273.1(a)(l)(i), (iii). Having no fixed address
(i.e., homelessness) will not prevent a person from receiving food stamps. Id. at §§ 273. 1(e)(v),
273.3.
212. 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.1(a)(1)(i), (ii) (1991).
213. Id. at § 273.1(a)(2)(i). Exceptions exist for the following individuals: parents with one
or more minor children can qualify as a separate household, as can elderly or disabled persons
and their spouses, provided they purchase and cook their food separately. Id. Persons who,
due to age or disability, are unable to prepare their own meals can form a distinct household
from relatives whom they live with if the relatives' income is less than 165% of the poverty
level. Id.
214. See H.R. REP. No. 396, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 16 (1991). Under the amended defi-
nition, parents and their minor children do not qualify as separate households. Id.
215. "Elderly or disabled" is defined at 7 C.F.R. § 271.2(l)-(1l) (1991). The Food Stamp
Act defines persons 60 years of age and older as "elderly." Persons are considered "disabled"
under the Food Stamp Act if they receive SSI, Social Security blindness or disability benefits,
state SSI payments, certain types of public disability retirement pensions, railroad retirement
disability payments, or veteran disability payments. Id.
216. See H.R. REP. No. 396, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 1 (1991). Households containing one
or more elderly members are currently held to the $3,000 resource limit. 7 C.F.R. § 273.8(b)
(1991); See generally 7 C.F.R. § 273.8 (regarding resource limits and excluded resources such
as a person's home, life insurance policies, and equipment or livestock that are related to
employment).
217. See H. REP. No. 396, 102d Cong., ist Sess. 5, 16 (1991).
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2. Proposed Additional Amendments
It appears likely that the Administration will propose an amendment re-
quiring parents who receive child support payments to cooperate with child
support enforcement agencies.21" Aid to Families with Dependant Children
(AFDC), 2 9 a federal-state program that provides cash grants to low-income
families with dependant children, 220 contains a child support sanctioning
clause. 22  This supports the likelihood that a similar amendment will be
proposed as part of the Leland bill.222 Regardless of its validity, the ration-
ale behind the AFDC child support cooperation requirement, that it in-
creases collection of child support payments, could be consistently applied to
all public assistance program, including the Food Stamp Program.
218. Interview with Joe Richardson, Specialist in Education and Public Welfare Division,
Congressional Research Service, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 29, 1991); see also CRS Leland
Bill Memorandum, supra note 195, at 4.
Under such an amendment, parents of dependent children receiving food stamps who do not
assist enforcement agencies in their efforts to locate or secure payment from persons required
to pay child support would be subject to sanctions. See Proposal to Require Cooperation with
Child Support Enforcement Agencies, Food & Nutrition Service, USDA (1991) [hereinafter
FNS Proposal]; David A. Super, Summary Concerns with the Administration's Child Support
Proposal (1991) (on file with author). FNS' proposal states that a custodial parent who, with-
out good cause, fails to adequately cooperate with the Child Support Enforcement agency will
be rendered ineligible to participate in the Food Stamp Program. FNS Proposal, supra, at 1.
The proposal defines "cooperation" and "good cause" and summarizes the new administrative
responsibilities assigned to food stamp offices as a result of the policy. Id. at 1-2.
219. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (1988).
220. See Adele M. Blong & Timothy J. Casey, AFDC Program Rules for Advocates: An
Overview, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 802 (1989).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988); 45 C.F.R. §§ 232.11, 302.51(0 (1990).
222. Telephone interview with Amie Berenson, Staff Attorney at Women's Legal Defense
Fund (August, 1991); see FNS Proposal, supra note 218.
Under AFDC regulations, a parent caring for one or more dependent children must, upon
application, assign any rights to monetary support that the parent or the child possesses. Co-
operation with enforcement agencies is required and includes establishing paternity, actively
pursuing the delinquent party, participating in court proceedings involving the non-paying
party, and declaring any and all payments received by the absentee parent. Only custodial
parents who can prove "good cause" are exempt from compliance. 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(b)
(1991); see also Blong & Casey, supra note 220, at 810. "The standards for good cause for
refusal to comply are stringent, 45 C.F.R. § 232.40-232.49, but states sometimes apply them
even more narrowly than permitted and/or provide scant notice of the right to claim good
cause." Id.
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B. Congressional Support for the Mickey Leland Childhood
Hunger Relief Act
In late July and early August of 1991, several Representatives made pas-
sionate statements supporting the Leland bill (H.R. 1202).223 Congressional
leaders asserted that domestic hunger is a very real and destructive problem
and that the current Food Stamp Program is ineffective.224 While ap-
plauding the Leland bill as a palpable method for improving access and in-
creasing food stamp benefits, several Congresspersons voiced concern that
the bill will not be enacted because of inadequate financing.223 Congressper-
sons praised the bill for protecting the children of low-income families from
the harmful effects of under-nutrition. 226 Rep. Dan Rostenkowski, however,
focused on the need to raise adequate revenues to fund the benefit increases
mandated by the bill.227
On July 31, 1991, the House Agriculture Subcommittee on Domestic
Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition approved the Leland bill.228
223. 137 CONG. REC. H5807-16, E2684-85, E2720-21 (daily ed. July 24, 1991) (spoken
statements of Reps. Hall, Gilman, Rostenkowski, Swett, Payne, Bentley, and Bacchus; submit-
ted statements of Reps. Emerson, De La Garza, Kennelly, Fazio, Coyne, AuCoin, Moody,
Gilchrest, Panetta, Penny, Kleczka, Towns, Bryant, Williams; extension of remarks of Rep.
Tallon); 137 CONG. REC. E2735 (daily ed. July 26, 1991) (extension of remarks of Rep. Espy);
137 CONG. REC. E2748 (daily ed. July 29, 1991) (extension of remarks by Rep. Hughes); 137
CONG. REC. E2797 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (extension of remarks of Rep. Sabo).
224. See id.
225. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. E2684 (daily ed. July 24, 1991) (statement by Rep. Robin
Tallon (D-SC) warning that during times of budgetary constraints "there is a tendency to pay
only lip-service to the pressing needs of the day").
226. See 137 CONG. REC. H5807-13, E2684-85, E2720-21 (daily ed. July 24, 1991); 137
CONG. REC. E2735 (daily ed. July 26, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. E2748 (daily ed. July 29, 1991);
137 CONG. REC. E2797 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991).
227. Rep. Rostenkowski (D-IL) stated, in part:
I rise in support of the Leland hunger bill with a combination of pride and
trepidation.
I fear that this bill will turn into nothing more than legislative junk food,
despite our good intentions, unless we are ready to back up our rhetoric with votes
for a proper funding mechanism. I worry that we may be misleading the hungry and
creating even deeper voter cynicism by over-promising-and then failing to deliver.
137 CONG. REC. H5808 (daily ed. July 24, 1991).
228. See House Comm. on Agriculture, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., News Release, "Childhood
Hunger Relief Act Approved by Agriculture Subcommittee" (July 31, 1991) (available from
House Agriculture Committee, Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations
and Nutrition). Quoting Rep. Robin Tallon, Subcommittee Chairman, the news release stated,
in part:
The Leland bill is an urgently needed reform of food stamp benefit levels. Currently,
the food stamp program does not adequately address the needs of high housing costs,
food costs or the realities of working families in America. This bill will enable the
food stamp program to respond to the economic realities of the 1990s.
1992]
Catholic University Law Review
The House Agriculture Committee successfully reported it out on October
16, 1991.229 As of December 13, 1991, H.R. 1202 had a total of 108 co-
sponsors (ninety-seven Democrats, eleven Republicans).230 In the Senate, as
of October 15, 1991, seven Democratic Senators had embraced the Senate
version of the Leland bill (S. 757).2 a1
C. Mickey Leland Bill's Chances of Passage
A large bipartisan contingent 232 passionately supports the goal of ending
domestic hunger and approves the Leland bill's Food Stamp Program re-
forms. Funding, however, continues to be uncertain and presents a debilitat-
ing obstacle.23 3 Before enactment, the Leland bill must be fully financed
through tax increases or reductions in program spending.234
Efforts to abate domestic hunger have appeared in earlier legislation.
Draft versions of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of
1990233 (the Farm bill) contained many of the provisions now offered by the
Leland bill. 236 However, recommendations that would have increased bene-
Id.
229. H.R. REP. No. 396, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see 137 CONG. REC. D1259 (daily
ed. Oct. 16, 1991) (Miscellaneous Measures); Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 1202, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bills File; see also, supra note 196 (outlining
the House Agriculture Committee's amendments to the Leland bill).
230. Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 1202, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Bills File.
231. Bill Tracking Report, S. 757, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Bills File.
232. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
233. See "FRAC Leland Bill Release," supra note 94 (asking FRAC members to urge
Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee members to finance the
Leland bill). But cf Ann Devroy, Bush Considers New Defense Cuts, WASH. POsT, Jan. 3,
1992, at Al. President Bush has intimated that the Administration may be open to altering
the provisions of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Agreement. The agreement, which set defense
and domestic spending ceilings, requires any additional cuts in defense to be put towards the
federal budget deficit rather than domestic programs. Defense budget reductions and a re-
negotiation of the budget agreement could provide funding for the Leland bill.
234. See H.R. REP. No. 396, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1991). Section 502 of the amended
bill states that:
[n]one of the provisions of this Act shall become effective unless the costs are fully
offset in each fiscal year through fiscal year 1996. No agriculture price or income
support program administered through the Commodity Credit Corporation under
the Agricultural Act of 1949 may be reduced to achieve such offset.
Id.
The estimated costs of the Leland bill for fiscal years 1992 through 1996 are approximately
$328 million (1992), $849 million (1993), $1.14 billion (1994), $1.4 billion (1995), and $1.6
billion (1996). See id. at 27.
235. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359 (1990).
236. See CRS Leland Bill Memorandum, supra note 195, at 4-5.
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fits and participation were deleted from the nutrition title of the 1990 Farm
bill as a result of the Senate Finance Committee's failure to authorize fund-
ing. Responding to the collapse of the Food Stamp Program reforms af-
ter the 1990 Budget Summit, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont
stated, "I do not want the summit negotiators to assume that I or other
members of this Committee are willing to just settle for extending these pro-
grams. Instead, we need to improve and save them." '238 Likewise, congres-
sional advocates of the Leland bill are now stridently petitioning their
colleagues to prevent the bill from being defeated because of budgetary
challenges.239
IV. MAKING THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM WORK: THE NEED TO
BOLSTER PRESENT DAY LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
Benevolence and economic pragmatism justify placing domestic hunger at
the top of our political agenda.2' Because societal decency is measured by
the manner in which independent members treat dependent members, hu-
manitarianism compels us to abate the hunger crisis. Moreover, because
healthy, motivated children are needed to maintain economic vitality,24 all
children should be provided with a nutritionally adequate diet. Food assist-
ance programs must exist to insure that low-income families and their chil-
dren receive sufficient nutrition.24'
The Food Stamp Act is a well-intentioned and potentially forceful law
aimed at abating domestic hunger.243 The Act mandates the federal and
state governments to render food assistance to households that lack the re-
sources to provide its members with sufficient nourishment. 2" The law does
not envision food stamp benefits as a household's sole means of purchasing
237. S. REP. No. 357, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1261 (1990) (additional views of Sen. Leahy);
see also OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1402-03. During the budget summit, the majority ruled
that the cost of the Food Stamp Program reforms, estimated at $6.5 billion, was excessive and
therefore declined to enact these provisions. See H.R. REP. No. 396, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-
25 (1991).
238. S. REP. No. 357, 101 Cong., 2d Sess. 1261 (1990) (additional views of Sen. Leahy).
Indeed, Senator Leahy appears to be following through with his promise to "continue [the]
fight for adequate funding." Id. at 1262.
239. See, e.g., supra note 225, 227 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 67, 68, 72-77 and accompanying text.
241. See CED's Nutrition Testimony, supra note 75, at 2.
242. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H5812 (daily ed. July 24, 1991) (statement by Rep. Towns)
("the lives of our Nation's children and this country's ability to compete worldwide depend on
our support for preventative measures to help children grow up smart and healthy.").
243. See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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food.245 Unfortunately, the Act and the Food Stamp Program it established
are not achieving the purpose they were enacted to serve.
A. Beefing Up the Leland Bill
The Mickey Leland Childhood Hunger Relief Act receives strong con-
gressional support and is promoted by organizations concerned with the
problems of poverty, hunger and under-nutrition. 246 Provisions of the bill
address some of the defects in the Food Stamp Act.247 Unfortunately, how-
ever, the bill in its current form will not correct the most serious failings of
the Food Stamp Program.24
The revisions to the Food Stamp Program effectuated by Title I of the
Leland bill are neither drastic nor innovative. For example, section 101
removes the $186 shelter cost cap imposed on non-elderly and non-disabled
households. The shelter deduction cap, which was imposed to prevent high-
income households from participating in the program, became obsolete with
the invocation of gross income limits. 249 Similarly, section 102 requires the
benefit level to be gradually raised each year until it reaches 105% percent of
the Thrifty Food Plan.25° Current benefit levels have long been viewed as
inadequate, and therefore, this amendment, while necessary, does not
demonstrate inspiration or courageous reform.251 The assistance provided
to homeless families under section 104, which permits the exclusion of ven-
dor payments for "transitional housing," is minimized by the fact that the
245. See OVERVIEW, supra note 44, at 1385. The law contemplates that a participating
household will spend thirty percent of its income (less permitted deductions) on food
purchases. Id.
246. See Leland Bill Advances; Gains Crucial Supporters, FOODLINES (Washington D.C.),
August/September 1991, at 1, 5.
247. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
248. See 137 CONG. REC. H5809 (daily ed. July 24, 1991) (statement by Rep. Emerson).
Rep. Bill Emerson characterized the ills of federal food assistance programs, stating that
[w]e have from time to time amended, patched, created, and eliminated within our
assistance apparatus. But it has left us with a monstrous and costly structure we all
too often seem afraid to discipline.
[t]he time has come to get on to the tough job of overhauling our public
assistance programs into an integrated and powerful package.
Id. The Leland bill is a legislative measure that amends approximately eighteen sections of the
Food Stamp Act: it is not "an integrated and powerful [reform] package." See id.
249. See Leland Analysis, supra note 195, at 1.
250. Id.; see also supra note 105 (regarding the methodology of the Thrifty Food Plan in
establishing benefit levels).
251. See supra note 105; see also Thrifty Food Plan Benefit Levels, 45 FED. REG. 22876
(1980) (stating that a diet based on the TFP provides only two-thirds of the Recommended
Daily Allowances).
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homeless, as a class, are substantially harmed by the explicit and implicit
barriers to participation.252 These problems must be resolved in order for
section 104 to operate effectively.
Sections 201 and 202 grant partial exemptions to the payors and recipients
of child support.2" These provisions make the proposed child support sanc-
tioning amendment superfluous by providing custodial and absentee parents
with incentive to cooperate with child support agencies.
254
By and large, section 30 I's modification of the definition of "household" is
a positive change.255 A drawback, however, is the likelihood that it will
initially increase the number of errors made by caseworkers when determin-
ing eligibility and benefit levels.25 6 Section 302 purports to increase assist-
ance for households containing one or more disabled persons by raising their
resource limit. The effect of this provision, like that of section 104, is tem-
pered by the phenomenon of participation barriers.257 While households
headed by a disabled person are shown to participate at a higher level than
households headed by able-bodied persons, access problems pose a signifi-
cant barrier to participation. 25' The Food Stamp Act currently contains
special provisions targeting elderly and disabled participants in order to
make it less onerous for members of these classes to apply and participate.259
Unfortunately, state food stamp offices are often either financially or philo-
252. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 68, at 59-60. Forty-eight
percent of the cities surveyed reported evidence of increasing hostility towards the homeless.
See generally supra notes 112-15, 132 and accompanying text (discussing the barriers to partic-
ipation that affect homeless persons).
253. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
254. See id.
255. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
256. See GAO, Food Stamp Program: The Household Definition Is Not a Major Source of
Caseworker Errors 5 (1990). GAO's study concluded that household definition errors
amounted to two to six percent of the total number of issuance errors and were therefore
insignificant. Id. GAO's report also stated that a majority of food stamp officials prefer the
definition to remain unchanged as alterations cause increased errors. Id.
257. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
258. See Coe, supra note 105, at 1048. Coe also found that welfare officials provide assist-
ance more readily to able-bodied persons than disabled persons, due in part to the belief that
applicants incorrectly classified themselves. Id. at 1048-49.
259. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(e)(2)(i) (1991) (stating that food stamp offices, under cer-
tain circumstances, are required to permit elderly or disabled households to have the interview
conducted by telephone or outside the food stamp offices); id. § 273.9(d)(3) (outlining income
deductions available to elderly or disabled households); id. § 273.21(b)(3) (excluding elderly
and disabled households from state MRRB systems); § 274.2(a) (declaring that "[s]tate agen-
cies shall assist [households comprised of elderly or disabled members] by arranging for the
mail issuance of coupons to them, by assisting them in finding authorized representatives who
can act on their behalf, or by using other appropriate means").
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sophically precluded from providing such services to elderly or disabled
individuals.26°
By removing caps, allowing greater deductions, raising the asset limit, and
altering the benefits formula, the Leland bill provides households with a
more economically realistic level of aid.261 Putting aside the aspirational
goals stated in the bill's titles, however, the main provisions of the bill invoke
precise, and in some cases, incremental changes rather than effectuating the
needed radical overhaul.262
The Leland bill does little to dismantle the regulations and administrative
practices that bar participation. 26a The bill's provisions do not make enroll-
ing in the Food Stamp Program simpler nor do they increase the likelihood
that a certified household will actually receive its benefits in a timely man-
ner. A major source of litigation involves claims that food stamp offices do
not evaluate applications or issue benefits within the thirty day federal time
limit.264 The Leland bill does not address these systemic problems, nor does
it have a mechanism that will inspire states to improve evaluation or issu-
ance performance.265
260. See supra note 143. Section 274.2 is a prime example of the "legislative junk food"
that Rep. Rostenkowski cautioned against during his remarks concerning the Leland bill. See
supra note 227. This section is hollow verbiage: actual operating food stamp offices are often
disinclined or incapable of providing elderly and disabled with the necessary assistance. See
supra note 114 and accompanying text. The provisions of the Leland bill should not duplicate
the lofty but ineffective allowances stated in the current regulations. See also MURRAY, supra
note 71; infra note 288 (describing the phenomenon of "escapism").
261. See News Release, House Comm. on Agric., "Childhood Hunger Relief Act Ap-
proved by Agriculture Subcommittee," (July 31, 1991) (available from Jim Davis, Agric.
Comm. Press Sec.).
262. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
263. For example, the District of Columbia began drafting a new all-in-one welfare appli-
cation form at the same time it implemented court-ordered program changes. (Note that the
District was essentially directed, under the terms of a settlement agreement with a coalition of
homeless individuals, to comply with federal law. The central charge of the class action suit
was that District food stamp offices were violating the Food Stamp Act by not providing
homeless individuals with expedited food stamps within five days of filing an application). If
the draft is accepted, which appears likely, a thirty page application will replace the current
five page food stamp application. The rationale for the all-in-one application is that it will
consolidate requests from households that qualify for more than one type of government assist-
ance and thereby improve efficiency. There is no provision within the Food Stamp Act, its
regulations, or the Leland bill limiting the length of a food stamp application. See Food Stamp
Lawsuit, FOOD STAMP UPDATE (D.C. Hunger Action, Wash., D.C.), April 23, 1991; Courts
Uphold Food Stamp Delivery Deadlines, FOODLINES, supra note 246, at 5; see also District of
Columbia, Income Maintenance, Draft Application (1991) (on file with D.C. Hunger Action,
Washington, D.C.).
264. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
265. See generally supra notes 200-17 and accompanying text (summarizing the provisions
of the Leland bill).
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The bill also fails to reduce the burdensome impact that frequent regula-
tory changes have on state public assistance agencies.266 Williams v. At-
kins 267 involved a dispute between a state's welfare department and persons
who had previously been awarded the right, under a consent degree, to re-
ceive immediate food assistance. An amendment to the Food Stamp Act in
1982 conflicted with the consent decree, causing the state commissioner to
vacate it. On appeal, the commissioner prevailed. The court in Williams
held that the USDA had authority to change the Food Stamp Program pro-
cedures regardless of the deleterious effects that such revisions may have
upon the states.26' This decision, and the many federal regulatory changes,
make administration of the Food Stamp Program a complicated task. State
Food Stamp Program officials have charged that the numerous and some-
times complex regulatory changes are a conscious and purposeful effort by
the federal government to limit food stamp expenditures.
2 69
B. Proposals for Change: Increasing the Effectiveness
of the Food Stamp Program
Today there are numerous disputes between individuals eligible to receive
food stamps and state welfare agencies.270 Surveys and monitoring reports
compiled by advocacy groups and community legal aid organizations 271
show that in many localities the Food Stamp Program is ineffectively admin-
istered.272 Congress has not addressed these systemic problems. Federal
policy makers are perhaps unaware of the haphazard administration of the
programs. It is more likely, however, that legislators are conscious of the
program flaws but are reluctant to eliminate the illicit practices because it
requires swallowing a bitter pill-either budgetary increases or tightening
eligibility.
Solving all of the administrative problems of the Food Stamp Program is
perhaps an insurmountable task. The program is governed by a complex
and sometimes unwieldy array of laws.27' That fact, however, is neither sur-
266. See supra notes 131, 138 and accompanying text.
267. 786 F.2d 457 (1st Cir. 1986).
268. See id.
269. BARRIERS, supra note 39, at 112-14 (stating that "the federal bureaucracy is being
used to make it more difficult for needy families to obtain food stamps").
270. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
272. See also Welfare Reform Hearing, supra note 8, at 7 (discussing the obvious need to
simplify the administrative operations of the Food Stamp Program); SCHWARTZ-NOBEL,
supra note 5, at 90-92 (describing the pattern of mismanagement within WIC and the Food
Stamp Program).
273. See Richard B. Cappalli, Federal Grant Disputes: The Lawyer's Next Domain, 11 URB.
LAW. 377, 378 (1979). "[I]n the typical federal grant program the grantee must comply with
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prising nor likely to change.274 Federal and local governments are, for bet-
ter or worse, multifarious, bureaucratic systems. Advocates of welfare
reform cannot allow the size of the task to discourage them. Decriers of
welfare programs275 propose to reform the system by imposing moral and
social standards on benefit recipients. 276 The recommendations of welfare
opponents are unacceptable because they are based on flawed assumptions.
One faulty assumption is that persons requesting public assistance do so
largely because they are "passive" and lack "middle-class values," which
277 Gvrmn nprevents them from seizing employment opportunities. Government and
private studies refute these contentions. 278 For example, a recently released
report by the United States Conference of Mayors identified the causes of
hunger and homelessness, conditions which often compel households to seek
public assistance, as being: unemployment because of recessionary firings
about thirty 'cross-cutting' and administrative conditions, plus whatever programmatic stan-
dards the particular program carries." Id. at 391.
274. Id. at 377. The "law of federal grants" is the mechanism which provides billions of
dollars of assistance to state government and independent sector public service agencies and
organizations. Grants may experience some "belt-tightening," but will remain a permanent
component of the Federal Government because they have a large public and congressional
constituency. Id. at 377-78. But cf S. PRAKASH SETHI, THE NATIONAL FOOD STAMP PRO-
GRAM: POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVING OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND PROGRAM INTEGRITY
THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR STRATEGIES AND MANAGEMENT TECH-
NIQUES, 37-40 (1979) (evaluating the applicability of marketing principles and practices to the
operation of the Food Stamp Program).
275. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text; see also Taylor, supra note 8, at Al, A8
(describing the views of Lawrence Mead, a framer of the behavior modification model of wel-
fare reform).
276. See Rector & McLaughlin, supra note 70, at 12-13. Rector and McLaughlin propose
six "principles of conservative welfare" which they suggest should be followed as a means of
formulating a new and improved welfare system. These principles involve: 1) recognizing that
welfare causes an increase in "behavioral poverty;" 2) accepting that some low-income persons
do not need nor deserve government aid; 3) preventing "one-way handouts;" 4) providing
incentives for the maintenance of traditional families and rewarding independence; 5) eliminat-
ing programs that reward "self-destructive" behavior; 6) and emphasizing policies, distinct
from welfare programs, that will improve the economy, reducing crime, and enrich the educa-
tion system. Id. at 12.
277. See Taylor, supra note 8, at Al-A8 (describing Lawrence Mead's thesis). Mead's be-
havior modification model rests on the notion that money should be given to the poor in a way
that "conveys a moral message." Id. at A8. The Food Stamp Program has with a degree of
success implemented provisions, such as employment and training programs, that impose so-
cial obligations upon some recipients. See CRS, FOOD STAMP PROGRAM REPORT, supra note
83, at 42-45 (describing the work registration and employment and training program require-
ments of the Food Stamp Program). Such requirements are, however, a far cry from the be-
havior modification proposals suggested by welfare opponents. Critics of behavior
modification argue that the theory is overly harsh and untested. See Taylor, supra note 8, at
A8.
278. See, e.g., supra note 111 (regarding the myths surrounding the Food Stamp Program
and the misconceptions of a typical recipient).
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and lay-offs, low wages, lack of adequate health care, and high housing
coStS. 27 9 Furthermore, the profile of the typical food stamp recipient contra-
dicts the assertions of welfare opponents.280
Another erroneous belief fueling conservative welfare policy is that strate-
gies of their opposition involve concealing "the truth" about welfare pro-
grams."8' On the contrary, liberal welfare reformists attest that lack of
information and misconceptions regarding public assistance is one of the
greatest obstacles to providing low-income households with meaningful
assistance.28 2 Reformers from this side of the debate advocate re-introduc-
ing outreach programs and other information networks in order to educate
the public. 283 Finally, conservative welfare policy is fatally flawed because it
opposes comprehensive reform.28 4 Modest, technical adjustments to the
Food Stamp Program have not corrected its defects. Comprehensive, force-
ful provisions must be invoked and enforced. 85
To abate domestic hunger, the Leland bill should be enacted, the barriers
to participation eliminated, and most importantly, state compliance must be
made achievable and a priority. Federal legislators currently do not ade-
quately consider the effect newly enacted regulations have on state and local
agencies' ability to disburse benefits effectively and fairly.286 As a result,
279. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 68, at 8, 35-36, 63.
280. See supra note I11.
281. See Rector & McLaughlin, supra note 70, at 13 (stating that "the first line of defense
for the liberal welfare system is disinformation"). Two assertions described as untruths the
American public mistakenly believes are that welfare benefits are low and that poor people do
not work because they are unable to obtain employment. Id.
282. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (describing poor information as the great-
est barrier to participation in the Food Stamp Program); see also supra note 111 (outlining the
myths and misconceptions of the Food Stamp Program and its beneficiaries).
283. See id.
284. See Rector & McLaughlin, supra note 70, at 13 (asserting that the sweeping reforms
proposed by liberals are "trojan horses" that merely extend benefits to undeserving individu-
als). See generally Thomas Moss, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helpless-
ness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991) (discussing how the American justice system supports the
general public's desire to avoid the burden of intervention by adopting the rhetoric of helpless-
ness). Thomas observes that when the holders of wealth realize that eliminating poverty
means actual sacrifice, they revert back to the position that poverty is caused by moral weak-
ness and is therefore not a problem that can be solved through the political or judicial process.
Id. at 1506. Further, Thomas argues that poverty is not a natural phenomenon but instead a
social product that continues to exist, in part, because of our lack of political imagination. Id.
at 1509, 1543.
285. See Welfare Reform Hearing, supra note 8, at 61-68 (testimony of Robert J. Fersh)
(advocating reforms that would help recipients acquire valuable job skills); id. at 85-92 (testi-
mony of Randale Valenti) (outlining ways of simplifying the Food Stamp Program); id. at 93
(testimony of Robert Greenstein) (encouraging improvement in the area of education and
other reforms).
286. See supra notes 58, 131, 266 and accompanying text; Cappalli, supra note 273, at 391.
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welfare agencies circumvent or even disregard federal standards in order to
accomplish what they see as the main objective of the program.2 s7 More-
over, the federal government's response when proof of non-compliance sur-
faces is to focus on the technical provisions of the program, rather than to
determine if the state's Food Stamp Program is effective and, if not, why.
288
The strategy for curing state non-compliance must use carrots rather than
the "stick" method of sanctioning because sanctions deter participation.28 9
Innovative plans to deliver benefits more efficiently, such as implementing
private sector marketing principles and practices should be tested.290 Exam-
ple of possible marketing techniques include: providing managers with co-
herent performance criteria and goals based on the general philosophy of
customer satisfaction; encouraging workers and administrators to propose
program revisions and allowing states to retain any savings that results from
improved operations; motivating recipient households to promote program
integrity.29I A provision should be added to the Food Stamp Act mandating
In this context, the United States federal government suffers from the same ills as Poland's
new democratic bureaucracy, which has been described as less responsive than the prior Com-
munist system. Cf. Mary Battiata, In Poland, Red Tape Knows No Ideology, WASH. POST,
Feb. 23, 1992, at A22. The new Polish government is characterized by one former public
official, Ewa Letowska, as a "saboteur of progress and change." Id Letowska's report re-
counts "an epidemic of buck-passing," stating that "[v]arious ministries tend to put off deci-
sions for years, while covering up their inaction with words ...like, 'The case is being
examined.'" Id. Letowska also charges that "[t]he effect of these [new] laws on real people
and real life is not considered. This is destroying people's trust and confidence in the state."
Id. Further, Letowska argues that lack of financial resources is not the obstacle but that "[ilt's
a problem of action and creativity. People are afraid of taking risks... The final reaction of
decision-makers is not to solve the problem, but to send a letter." Id. The bureaucracies of the
United States and Poland are, in this sense, startlingly similar.
287. Cappalli, supra note 273, at 392. Note, however, that the impetus for avoiding federal
rules does not always spring from good intentions; individual social service personnel are not
immune from prejudice. See GAO, Administrative Hindrances, supra note 119, at 14.
288. See Cappalli, supra note 273, at 384. Because a program's goals, structure, and stan-
dards are often vague or convoluted, whether or not the program is accomplishing its stated
purpose is not the focus of a review. Id. at 383.
Charles Murray, a conservative social policy analyst, coined the phrase "escapism" to de-
scribe legislators' response to social problems. See MURRAY, supra note 71, at 235. Murray
observed that "those who legislate and administer and write about social policy can tolerate
any increase in actual suffering as long as the system in place does not explicitly permit it." Id.
Murray advised that rather than "try[ing] to take care of 100 percent of the problem and
making matters worse ... we [should] solve 75 percent of the problem." Id. (emphasis added).
289. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
290. See SETHI, supra note 274, at 6-7, 37-40. Professor Sethi acknowledges that public
sector programs, which exist for political rather than economic purposes, are qualitatively
different from private sector projects. Id. at 37. Nonetheless, Professor Sethi concludes that
these differences can be accommodated so that marketing concepts can be used to improve
administration of the Food Stamp Program. Id.
291. See id. at 2-3, 37-40.
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that an assembly of non-governmental organizations specializing in food
stamp law be authorized to monitor state compliance.29 2 The number of
households eligible to receive food stamps in a particular locale should be
forecasted based on the area's poverty level and the demands placed on local
food providers. These estimated figures should then be compared with the
number of participating households to determine how well the welfare
agency is servicing needy households. Food Stamp Program administrators
and case workers should be given incentives to maintain high participation
rates.2 93
V. CONCLUSION
The Food Stamp Act rejects the severe notion that a flourishing society is
one that allows only the physically strong and mentally sound to survive.
Over $19 billion will be spent this year on the Food Stamp Program. The
expectation behind the law is that most if not all members of the population
will be provided with minimal nutrition. Comprehensive investigation and
analysis reveal however that the current strategy for abating domestic hun-
ger is not effective and that tinkering with legislation as vast as the Food
Stamp Act is a feigned remedy.
Eradicating the problem of domestic hunger requires a pragmatic determi-
nation of how many people can be provided with meaningful assistance. The
objective of state food stamp administrators must be to provide those indi-
viduals with food stamps in an efficient and nonprejudicial manner. Federal
legislators must reconcile their public loaves and fishes portrayal of food
stamp benefits with the regulations and unofficial procedures that preclude
eligible persons from participating in the Food Stamp Program. Procedures
that present administrative encumbrances must be aborted. Regulations
should be invoked that hold individuals accountable for ineffective program
292. Hunger coalitions in several cities across the nation have monitored food stamp of-
fices. See supra note 134. Areas of inquiry include: whether applicants are provided with
accurate information; whether requests for benefits are processed in a timely manner; whether
decisions regarding eligibility and benefit levels are fairly and correctly calculated; and whether
eligible households receive food stamp benefits within the 5 or 30 day deadline.
293. As part of an incentive package, salary levels could be directly tied to participation
rates. Under such a system, employees of a food stamp office that showed a participation rate
of 50% would earn half of a set salary. As a result, public assistance administrators and
workers would be motivated to certify all eligible households within their jurisdiction. See
SCHWARTZ-NOBEL supra note 5, at 99. Small monetary bonuses or public recognition could
be awarded to individual case workers who competently processed the greatest number of food
stamp applications.
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management. Policies that inspire legislators and welfare administrators to
increase participation in the Food Stamp Program should be implemented.
Karen Terhune
